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REDISTRICTING REFORM IN WISCONSIN TO 
CURTAIL GERRYMANDERING: THE WISCONSIN 
IMPARTIAL CITIZENS REDISTRICTING 
COMMISSION 
  
 After an extremely partisan gerrymander in 2011, Wisconsin needs 
redistricting reform in order to eliminate partisan politics from the process.  
Now more than ever, momentum for change has reached its peak: the Wisconsin 
legislative maps as drawn in 2011 were ruled unconstitutional in Whitford v. 
Gill; the Supreme Court has recently ruled in favor of states implementing 
independent redistricting commissions; and nearly half of the states in the 
United States are beginning to use independent commissions for redistricting.  
This Comment proposes a unique approach for Wisconsin to adopt in order to 
curtail gerrymandering: the Wisconsin Impartial Citizens Redistricting 
Commission (WICRC).  Under this scheme, Wisconsin would go further than 
other states and employ a commission comprised of nonvoting or seldom voting 
citizens who are selected by the Wisconsin Elections Commission in a process 
that parallels jury selection.  The WICRC would be provided with population 
data and partisanship scores in order to reduce partisan bias while maximizing 
competition.  While this approach may seem counter-intuitive, at the very least 
this Comment serves as a thought experiment in an effort to inspire redistricting 
reform in Wisconsin, and perhaps elsewhere in the United States. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Say what you want about newly elected President Donald Trump, but of all 
his controversial statements made while on the campaign trail, one was spot on: 
“[O]ur system is absolutely, totally rigged.”1  This Comment does not focus on 
President Trump’s claims of a systematic rigging of elections, which were the 
crux of his “rigged” claims.2  Rather, it focuses on another phenomenon that 
does rig our system and inhibits our democracy: gerrymandering.  President 
Barack Obama recently recognized gerrymandering as a threat to our 
democracy in his Farewell Address, as he said, “Our democracy is threatened 
whenever we take it for granted.  All of us . . . should be throwing ourselves 
into the task of rebuilding our democratic institutions. . . . [W]e should draw 
 
1. Robert Farley, Trump’s ‘Rigged’ Claim, FACTCHECK.ORG (July 12, 2016), 
https://www.factcheck.org/2016/07/trumps-rigged-claim/ [https://perma.cc/N4KB-K6UJ] (quoting 
President Trump at a rally on July 5, 2016, in Raleigh, North Carolina). 
2. See id. 
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our congressional districts to encourage politicians to cater to common sense 
and not rigid extremes.”3 
Every ten years, each state engages in a process of redrawing and 
reapportioning congressional and state legislative districts based upon data 
collected by the United States Census Bureau.4  At the hands of both political 
parties,5 gerrymandering—the partisan manipulation of political district 
boundaries to give a political party or incumbents an advantage in future 
elections6—plagues this process, giving many political districts very odd 
shapes.7  Gerrymandering has become a serious issue in the United States, as it 
has been a chief cause of the election of very partisan legislators and a 
gridlocked legislative process.8  The battleground state of Wisconsin serves as 
 
3. Barack H. Obama, President of the United States, Farewell Address to the Nation from 
Chicago, Illinois (Jan. 10, 2017) [hereinafter President Obama, Farewell Address].  President Obama 
has also stated that one of his post-presidency projects will be combatting gerrymandering after the 
2020 Census.  Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to Hear Potentially Landmark Case on Partisan 
Gerrymandering, WASH. POST (June 19, 2017) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-to-hear-potentially-landmark-
case-on-partisan-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/CQ75-AK9Q] [hereinafter Barnes, Supreme Court 
to Hear Potentially Landmark Case on Gerrymandering] (insert URL into Google.com search engine; 
then follow “Supreme Court to hear potentially landmark case – The Washington Post” hyperlink).  
4. Michael Wines, Judges Find Wisconsin Redistricting Unfairly Favored Republicans, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2f0oNEH [https://perma.cc/NHA9-R4V6] [hereinafter Wines, 
Wisconsin Redistricting Favored Republicans].  
5. Christopher Ingraham, This is Actually What America Would Look like Without 
Gerrymandering, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/01/13/this-is-actually-what-america-would-
look-like-without-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/F237-K757].  Ingraham argues that determination 
of political districts should be a task for computers, and mentions how “[s]ome state legislatures are 
more brazen about the process than others.  Maryland’s districts, drawn by Democrats, are one 
particularly egregious example.  North Carolina’s, drawn by Republicans, are another.”  Id. 
6. Christopher Ingraham, This is the Best Explanation of Gerrymandering You Will Ever See, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/03/01/this-is-the-
best-explanation-of-gerrymandering-you-will-ever-see [https://perma.cc/95H9-WYSN]; see also 
Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015) (defining 
partisan gerrymandering as “the drawing of legislative district lines to subordinate adherents of one 
political party and entrench a rival party in power”). 
7. Christopher Ingraham, America’s Most Gerrymandered Congressional Districts, WASH. POST 
(May 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/05/15/americas-most-
gerrymandered-congressional-districts [https://perma.cc/GN92-G3D8] (providing examples of 
irregularly shaped districts arising from 2011 redistricting and even giving some of them creative 
names, such as calling Pennsylvania’s 7th Congressional District “Goofy Kicking Donald Duck”). 
8. See generally Nathan S. Catanese, Gerrymandered Gridlock: Addressing the Hazardous 
Impact of Partisan Redistricting, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 323 (2014) [hereinafter 
Catanese, Gerrymandered Gridlock]. 
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arguably the best example in the nation of how political districts have been 
altered for the sake of gaining partisan advantage.9 
With the 2020 census only a few years away, swift action is needed in 
Wisconsin in order to institute a nonpartisan, impartial redistricting and 
reapportionment process.  Momentum for reform is growing, especially 
because, in what was an unprecedented decision, the Western District of 
Wisconsin in Whitford v. Gill struck down part of Wisconsin’s 2011 
redistricting scheme because it “constitutes an unconstitutional political 
gerrymander.”10  While the court did institute a short-term remedy by calling 
for the state legislature to craft new Assembly districts by November 1, 2017,11 
I ultimately see the holding of this case as a call to action for reform in 
Wisconsin.  My suggestion is to scrap the current framework and implement an 
independent, impartial, and nonpartisan redistricting body called the Wisconsin 
Impartial Citizens Redistricting Commission.12  Such a scheme would rely on 
Wisconsinites who do not vote or who rarely vote to construct political districts.  
While relying on laypersons for such an important task might seem counter-
intuitive, this Comment should at least stimulate discussion to develop unique 
ideas aimed at curtailing partisan gerrymandering.   
This Comment focuses on curtailing partisan gerrymandering in Wisconsin 
by introducing a unique framework by which Wisconsin should redraw and 
reapportion congressional and state legislative districts.  Part II provides an 
overview of what gerrymandering is, the methods and consequences of 
gerrymandering, and where states derive their authority to draw political 
districts.  Part II also discusses the current Wisconsin redistricting process and 
provides examples of gerrymandered Wisconsin districts that resulted from 
2011 redistricting.  Part II lastly examines the unconstitutionality of 
Wisconsin’s gerrymandered districts by reviewing Whitford v. Gill, which held 
that the State Assembly maps are unconstitutional and also set forth a standard 
 
9. See Craig Gilbert, The Red & The Blue: Political Polarization Through the Prism of 
Metropolitan Milwaukee, MARQ. LAW., Fall 2014, at 10 [hereinafter Gilbert, Red & Blue] (noting that, 
for instance, southeastern Wisconsin has become “the most polarized part of a polarized state in a 
polarized nation”); Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
10. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 843. 
11. On January 27, 2017, the court ordered the state legislature to enact a new redistricting map 
by November 1, 2017, in accordance with the determination of its decision and contingent upon the 
Supreme Court’s affirmance of the court’s judgment.  Opinion and Order at 7, Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 
3d 837 (No. 15-cv-421-bbc) (enjoining defendants from using the districting scheme of Act 43 and 
requiring that defendants craft a remedial redistricting plan for the November 2018 election).  On June 
19, 2017, the Supreme Court stayed the Western District’s decision and granted certiorari to hear the 
case during its term beginning in October 2017.  Barnes, Supreme Court to Hear Potentially Landmark 
Case on Gerrymandering, supra note 3. 
12. See infra Part IV. 
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for reviewing the constitutionality of political boundaries.  Part III gives 
examples of approaches that other states have taken to combat gerrymandering, 
such as implementing independent commissions of various kinds.  Part III then 
critiques these approaches.  Finally, Part IV proposes a new framework that 
Wisconsin should adopt to insulate its redistricting processes from partisan 
gerrymandering given its unique political makeup, activism, and demographics.  
The central feature of the framework proposed involves using citizens who 
seldom vote or who never vote to draw the new political boundaries.  Given 
that this is a new approach to combating gerrymandering, Part IV also identifies 
affirmative arguments in favor of the idea and addresses potential 
counterarguments.  Part V then concludes this Comment.  
II. AN OVERVIEW OF GERRYMANDERING AND WISCONSIN’S CURRENT 
REDISTRICTING PROCESS 
Gerrymandering is centuries old, and state legislators only continue to 
employ the practice when exercising their constitutional prerogative of 
redrawing political boundaries to achieve electoral advantages.13  Wisconsin’s 
2011 redistricting cycle serves as a prime example of how states craft districts 
in ways to favor the state’s majority party.14 
A. A History and Overview of Partisan Gerrymandering 
Gerrymandering is a practice that has its genesis in the state of 
Massachusetts over 200 years ago and is named after a signer of the Declaration 
of Independence, Mr. Elbridge Gerry.15  In 1812, Mr. Gerry—the governor of 
Massachusetts at the time—signed into law a legislative map that had districts 
drawn to benefit his political party.16  The Boston Gazette recognized the 
irregular political districts, and in response famously published a cartoon 
shaping one of the districts to look like a salamander.17  These events gave rise 
to the term and practice of what we now dub as “gerrymandering.”18 
There are several ways in which state legislators can alter political 
boundaries for partisan gain.  One common technique is known as “cracking”—
 
13. Carl Hulse, Seeking to End Gerrymandering’s Enduring Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2016), 
https://nyti.ms/1K7pupo [https://perma.cc/BG69-sWRN] [hereinafter Hulse, Gerrymandering’s 
Legacy].  
14. Wines, Wisconsin Redistricting Favored Republicans, supra note 4. 
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dividing a party’s supporters among numerous districts so that the party cannot 
reach a majority in any district.19  Another popular technique is to “pack,” or 
concentrate, as much of the electorate of a political party into one or as few 
districts as possible.20  By doing so, the party being concentrated controls as 
few districts as possible in the state, while the electorate of the other party is 
spread out to several districts so that it can control just about every other 
political district in the state; “packing” wastes the vote of certain electorate 
blocks because that party will achieve overwhelming majorities in only a few 
districts.21  In this way, state legislators of the majority party can concede only 
a few political districts by creating politically homogeneous districts that favor 
the opposing party, while in turn spreading out their voters amongst the other 
political districts within the state.22  Either way, whether cracking or packing, 
the result is wasted votes, as votes are cast either for a candidate that has no 
chance of winning because one party’s voters constitute a small presence in the 
district, or for a victorious candidate but in an excess of what is needed to win.23 
There are several consequences of gerrymandering districts for partisan 
advantage.  Deliberately created politically homogenous districts have the 
result of producing politically extreme legislators.24  Very partisan legislators 
do not have an incentive to moderate their views because they are insulated 
from losing to opposite party challengers as they are a product of a politically 
lopsided electorate.25  Therefore, the ultimate result of gerrymandering is 
gridlock and less policymaking because politically extreme legislators, 
knowing that they are guaranteed reelection, have no need to make bipartisan 
 
19. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
20. See Catanese, Gerrymandered Gridlock, supra note 8, at 329. 
21. Id. (providing an example of how Pennsylvania clearly used a “packing” strategy to compact 
Democrats while spreading out Republican votes to more districts within the state—as a result, even 
though the votes cast for Democrats and Republicans in November 2012 were nearly equal, the 
Pennsylvania congressional delegation had thirteen Republicans and only five Democrats). 
22. Id. 
23. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d. at 854. 
24. See Catanese, Gerrymandered Gridlock, supra note 8, at 324. 
25. See President Obama, Farewell Address, supra note 3 (“[W]e should draw our . . . districts 
to encourage politicians to cater to common sense and not rigid extremes.”); see also Catanese, 
Gerrymandered Gridlock, supra note 8, at 324 (“[S]tate lawmakers have tried to achieve hyperpartisan 
gain through the redistricting process. . . . This arrangement favors electing ideologically extreme 
candidates that have little to no interest in making political compromises, especially since it increases 
the likelihood of a primary election challenger.”). 
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deals or strive for common ground.26  Another consequence is that debate 
within the majority party of a state can be reduced.27  Incumbents representing 
politically extreme districts have a greater chance of losing to more 
ideologically extreme candidates in primary elections that would better cater to 
the desires of the politically extreme district.28  The result is the election of 
legislators who are even more extreme, and thus gridlock only grows.29  Also, 
in addition to feeling the need to represent only the dominant constituency, “a 
representative may feel more beholden to the cartographers who drew her 
district than to the constituents who live there.”30  In this manner, legislators 
will give different weights and legislative responsiveness to different 
constituents.31  Another significant consequence of partisan gerrymandering is 
that one political party in a state could seize perpetual power, as it can retain a 
majority as it moves from one decennial period to the next so that it retains 
control over future redistricting processes.32  Overall, gerrymandering is not 
compatible with democratic principles of competition and fair representation,33 
as its ultimate result is dysfunctional governance. 
B. State Authority to Draw and Apportion Political Boundaries 
Today, many states take heed to the example of Governor Gerry and craft 
their state’s political districts to gain advantage for their party in federal and 
state elections.34  The United States Constitution gives states the prerogative to 
regulate congressional and local elections, and the specific methods are further 
defined in the constitutions and statutes of each state.35  Specifically, the 
Constitution states, “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
 
26. See Catanese, Gerrymandered Gridlock, supra note 8, at 323–24 (“Gridlock not only 
increases the likelihood that the federal government will default on its debt obligations, but is also bad 
for public policy in general.”); see also Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 927.   
27. See Catanese, Gerrymandered Gridlock, supra note 8, at 324, 339–40. 
28. See id. 
29. See id. 
30. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 879 (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 
U.S. 399, 470 (2006)). 
31. Id. at 887. 
32. See id. at 895.  See generally Catanese, Gerrymandered Gridlock, supra note 8. 
33. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 
(2015). 
34. See Hulse, Gerrymandering’s Legacy, supra note 13. 
35. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d. at 844 (first citing Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993); 
then citing Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975) (“Reapportionment of state legislative districts is 
a responsibility constitutionally vested in the state government.”)). 
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Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter 
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”36  The authority 
to regulate elections includes drawing and reapportioning new boundaries for 
congressional and local districts based on the new census data gathered every 
ten years.37  The Constitution requires that a census be taken every ten years;38 
and the exact procedures and deadlines for gathering and handling population 
and other census information are proscribed in 13 U.S.C. § 141.39   
C. Wisconsin’s Current Framework for District Drawing and 
Reapportionment 
While some states give district drawing authority to neutral, independent 
bodies to try to avoid the issues of partisan gerrymandering,40 in Wisconsin the 
bicameral state legislature has the responsibility of reapportioning 
congressional and state districts.41  According to the Wisconsin Constitution, 
“the legislature shall apportion and district anew the members of the senate and 
assembly, according to the number of inhabitants.”42  In this way, Wisconsin 
treats redistricting like any other piece of legislation, in which the state 
legislature draws the legislative district boundaries.43  Once the redistricting bill 
passes both houses of the state legislature, the bill is then “presented to the 
governor” for him or her to either sign into law or veto.44   
 
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
37. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3; see also Jason Stein & Patrick Marley, GOP Redistricting Maps 
Make Dramatic Changes, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (July 8, 2011), 
https://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/125225179.html [https://perma.cc/F22P-Y8JZ] 
[hereinafter Stein & Marley, GOP Maps Make Changes].  
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after 
the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, 
in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.”). 
39. 13 U.S.C. § 141(a) (2012) (“The Secretary [of Commerce] shall, in the year 1980 and every 
10 years thereafter, take a decennial census of population as of the first day of April of such year. . . . In 
connection with any such census, the Secretary is authorized to obtain such other census information 
as necessary.”). 
40. See infra Part III. 
41. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 844 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (“[T]he people of Wisconsin 
have so far chosen to rely on its legislature to reapportion its districts after the decennial census.”). 
42. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
43. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 845 (discussing that the “[r]edistricting laws in Wisconsin are 
enacted . . . in the same manner as other legislation”).  The court’s opinion provides an explanation of 
the legislative process from the perspective of Tad Ottman, aide to the Senate Majority Leader.  Id.  
44. WIS. CONST. art. V, § 10. 
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There are state and federal requirements imposed upon Wisconsin 
reapportionment legislation.  First, federal law requires that the districts be 
approximately equal in population; each congressional district needs to have 
about the same population as other congressional districts, and state districts 
need to have approximately the same population as other state districts.45  States 
must also comply with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which 
mandates that, in order to ensure that minority groups have an opportunity to 
elect candidates of their choice, states cannot dilute the voting power of ethnic 
or racial minority groups.46  Next, requirements specific to Wisconsin 
districting are found in the Wisconsin Constitution.47  In particular, State 
Assembly districts are “to be bounded by county, precinct, town or ward lines, 
to consist of contiguous territory and be in as compact form as practicable.”48  
Also, “no assembly district shall be divided in the formation of a senate 
district.”49  It has also been observed that “[a]lthough avoiding the division of 
counties is no longer an inviolable principle, respect for the prerogatives of the 
Wisconsin Constitution dictate that wards and municipalities be kept whole 
where possible.”50   
With a population growth of about 320,000, or 6%, between the 2000 
census and 2010 census,51 the state legislature had to redraw both the 
congressional and state legislative districts to fulfill its constitutional duty and 
account for this population increase.52  In 2010, Republicans in Wisconsin 
swept the ticket as voters elected a Republican majority in the State Assembly, 
 
45. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (holding that Article I, Section 2 of the 
Constitution requires that the congressional districts be proportionate to one another so that “as nearly 
as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s”).  For 
example, given that Wisconsin’s population based on the 2010 U.S. Census was about 5,686,986, the 
ideal population for each of Wisconsin’s eight congressional districts was about 710,873.  WISCONSIN 
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 2011–2012, at 17 (Lynn 
Lemanski et al. eds. 2011) [hereinafter BLUE BOOK 2011–2012]. 
46. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012).  See generally Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
47. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
48. Id.; see also Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d. at 844. 
49. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 5; see also Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 844. 
50. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 844 (alteration in original) (quoting Baumgart v. Wendelberger, 
No. 01-C-0121, 2002 WL 34127471, at *3 (E.D. Wis. May 30, 2002), amended by 2002 WL 34127473 
(E.D. Wis. July 11, 2002)). 
51. Paul Mackun & Steven Wilson, Population Distribution and Change: 2000 to 2010 (U.S. 
Census Bureau, C2010BR-01, March 2011). 
52. Id. 
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a Republican majority in the State Senate, and a Republican governor.53  So, 
Republicans had complete control in laying the new political boundaries, and, 
thus, could redraw the state’s eight congressional districts and 132 state 
legislative districts to the exclusion of any input from Democrats.54  After 
 
53. See Fall 2010 General Election Results, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Nov. 2, 2010), 
http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/105000829.html [https://perma.cc/GNF5-D5A9]; 
Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 846 (“In 2010, for the first time in over forty years, the voters of Wisconsin 
elected a Republican majority in the Assembly, a Republican majority in the Senate, and a Republican 
Governor.”).  After the 2010 election, the Wisconsin state legislature flipped from Democratic to 
Republican as Republicans became the majority party of the State Senate (19 Republicans to 14 
Democrats) and the majority party in the State Assembly (60 Republicans to 38 Democrats).  2010 
Fall General Election Results, WIS. ELECTIONS COMM’N (Dec. 1, 2010), 
http://elections.wi.gov/elections-voting/results/2010/fall-general [https://perma.cc/3G9B-8BPA].  
Wisconsin also elected Republican Governor Scott Walker as successor to Democratic Governor Jim 
Doyle.  Id.  
54. Several commentators describe how state Republican lawmakers retained law firms to help 
draw the new boundaries behind closed doors without any input from Democrats or the public.  See 
Stein & Marley, GOP Maps Make Changes, supra note 37; see also David Michael Miller, Slaying the 
Gerrymander: The Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau Maps Nonpartisan Redistricting, 
ISTHMUS (Feb. 6, 2014), http://isthmus.com/news/slaying-the-gerrymander [https://perma.cc/87M3-
N6EZ] [hereinafter Miller, Slaying the Gerrymander]; Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 846–47.  In the 
facts of Whitford, the court describes the drafting of Act 43—the maps for the State Senate and 
Assembly districts.  See id. at 846–53.  Specifically, Judge Ripple discusses how Republican leadership 
in January 2011 retained various attorneys and law firms to assist and supervise the work of Tad 
Ottman, staff member to Senate Majority Leader Scott Fitzgerald, and Adam Foltz, staff member to 
Assembly Speaker Jeff Fitzgerald, in planning and drafting the new districts.  Id. at 846–47.  These 
individuals utilized redistricting software called autoBound, which provided demographic information 
for different areas of the map such as population, existing district boundaries, and different minority 
group populations.  Id. at 847–48.  Ottman and Foltz were also able to assess the partisan make-up and 
impact of the new districts they were drawing.  Id. at 848.  When they created a statewide map, they 
exported “district-by-district partisanship scores from autoBound.”  Id. at 849.  “The drafters used their 
composite score to evaluate the statewide maps that they had drawn based on the level of partisan 
advantage that they provided to Republicans.”  Id.  With each statewide map the drafters completed, 
the map “improved upon the anticipated pro-Republican advantage generated in the initial” draft plans, 
increasing the number of Republican safe seats and Republican leaning seats and decreasing the 
amount of swing seats.  Id. at 850.  The drafters then presented maps and partisan scores to the 
Republican leadership in the legislature.  Id. at 851.  Under the “‘Final Map,’ the Republicans could 
expect to win 59 Assembly seats, with 38 safe Republican seats, 14 leaning Republican, 10 swing, 4 
leaning Democratic, and 33 safe Democratic seats.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  Once the map was 
eventually finalized, the drafters “presented each Republican member of the Assembly with 
information on his or her new district” with a memorandum that “detailed what percentage of the 
population in the old and new districts voted for Republican candidates in representative statewide and 
national elections held since 2004.”  Id. at 852.  The drafters “engaged in a similar process with 
Republican members of the State Senate” and also gave a presentation to the Republican caucus.  Id. 
at 852–53.  In fact, Ottman’s notes from the meeting with the Republican caucus state: “The maps we 
pass will determine who’s here 10 years from now, and [w]e have an opportunity and an obligation to 
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months of secret drafting, the Republican leadership revealed the new district 
maps on July 11, 2011, as 2011 Senate Bills 148 and 149—concerning State 
Senate and Assembly districts and congressional districts, respectively.55  These 
bills passed along strict party lines on July 19th and 20th, and were signed by 
Governor Walker on August 9, 2011.56  These new maps were published in 
August 2011 and are codified in the Wisconsin statutes.57 
D. Examples of Gerrymandering in Wisconsin 
One way in which Republican state lawmakers gerrymandered districts in 
their favor was by packing Democratic voters into a few districts to dilute their 
vote across the state.58  For example, in addition to retaining Democratic 
strongholds like Eau Claire, Democratic Congressman Ron Kind’s 3rd 
Congressional District was given an arm connecting it to counties in central 
Wisconsin, such as Portage County, that have given Democrats victories in the 
past.59  This change is seen in comparing Figures 1 and 2, which are provided 
below.  In another example, Democratic voters were packed into 
 
draw these maps that Republicans haven’t had in decades.”  Id. at 853 (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). 
55. S. 148, 2011 Leg., 100th Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2011); S. 149, 2011 Leg., 100th Reg. Sess. (Wis. 
2011).  See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 853; see also Miller, Slaying the Gerrymander, supra note 
54. 
56. S. 148, 2011 Leg., 100th Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2011); S. 149, 2011 Leg., 100th Reg. Sess. (Wis. 
2011).  See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 853; see also Miller, Slaying the Gerrymander, supra note 
54. 
57. Chapter 3 of the Wisconsin Statutes establishes the boundaries of the eight congressional 
districts, and Chapter 4 of the Wisconsin Statutes establishes the boundaries of the 33 State Senate 
districts and the 99 State Assembly districts.  WIS. STAT. §§ 3.11–3.18 (2015–2016); id. §§ 4.009–
4.99. 
58. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 854. 
59. Craig Gilbert, GOP Redistricting Plan Has Republican Cong. Sean Duffy’s Re-election in 
Mind, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (June 13, 2011), http://archive.jsonline.com/ 
blogs/news/123782889.html [https://perma.cc/D4Y6-TPCJ].  For an example of Rep. Kind’s redrawn 
3rd Congressional District, compare WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF 
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 2009–2010, at 17 (Lynn Lemanski et al. eds. 2009) [hereinafter BLUE BOOK 
2009–2010] (providing a visual of Chapter 3 of the 2007–2008 Wisconsin Statutes), with BLUE BOOK 
2011–2012, supra note 45, at 17 (providing a visual of the new congressional districts enacted by 2011 
Wisconsin Act 44, which shows that Rep. Kind’s 3rd Congressional District added an arm extending 
into central Wisconsin to include Portage County).  For examples of complete election results, see 
Wisconsin Election Results, WIS. ELECTIONS COMM’N, http://elections.wi.gov/elections-voting/results 
[https://perma.cc/JSE9-HGJY] (last visited Dec. 27, 2016) (from here you can navigate the website to 
find Wisconsin election results from previous elections–general and primaries; for instance, election 
results illustrate that in congressional and presidential elections since 2004, Eau Claire has voted in 
favor of Democrats, while Portage County, has been trending Democratic since 2004). 
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Congresswoman Gwen Moore’s 4th Congressional District.  Alongside 
keeping the entire city of Milwaukee and retaining the clear divide from the 
deeply-rooted conservative counties of Waukesha, Ozaukee, and Washington, 
the 4th Congressional District added several cities to the north that lean 
Democratic.60  This change is also seen in comparing Figures 1 and 2. 
Another way that Wisconsin Republican lawmakers gerrymandered 
districts was by pulling conservative voting blocks into Republican districts to 
help Republican incumbents secure future elections.  For instance, Republicans 
moved some growing conservative counties, such as St. Croix and Clark 
counties, out of Congressman Kind’s district and into Republican Congressman 
Sean Duffy’s 7th Congressional District to protect him from Democratic 
challengers.61  In another example, Republicans also cut out some Democratic 
areas of House Speaker Paul Ryan’s 1st Congressional District and added some 
of Waukesha County’s more conservative suburbs to his district.62  These 
changes are evident in comparing Figures 1 and 2. 
 
60. See Gilbert, Red & Blue, supra note 9, at 17.  For an example of Rep. Moore’s redrawn 4th 
Congressional District, compare BLUE BOOK 2009–2010, supra note 59, at 17 (providing a visual of 
Chapter 3 of the 2007–2008 Wisconsin Statutes), with BLUE BOOK 2011–2012, supra note 45, at 17 
(providing a visual of the new congressional districts enacted by 2011 Wisconsin Act 44, which shows 
that Rep. Moore’s district expanded to the north of Milwaukee County).  For examples of complete 
election results, see Wisconsin Election Results, supra note 59 (explaining, for instance, that 
Milwaukee has given Democrat candidates sizeable majorities, sometimes above 70%, such as in the 
2014 gubernatorial election, or even touching 80%, such as in the 2012 presidential election; 
additionally, cities that were added to the district in 2011, such as Glendale, Shorewood, Whitefish 
Bay, and Fox Point, have voted Democrat in nearly every election in the past decade). 
61. Miller, Slaying the Gerrymander, supra note 54.  For an example of Rep. Duffy’s redrawn 
7th Congressional District, compare BLUE BOOK 2009–2010, supra note 59, at 17 (providing a visual 
of Chapter 3 of the 2007–2008 Wisconsin Statutes), with BLUE Book 2011–2012, supra note 45, at 17 
(providing a visual of the new congressional districts enacted by 2011 Wisconsin Act 44, which shows 
that St. Croix and Clark counties were absorbed by the 7th Congressional District as they were taken 
out of the 3rd Congressional District).  For examples of complete election results, see 2016 Fall 
General Election Results, WIS. ELECTIONS COMM’N (Nov. 8, 2016), http://elections.wi.gov/elections-
voting/results/2016/fall-general [https://perma.cc/C4MJ-TNMX] (explaining, for example, that St. 
Croix and Clark counties since 2010 have tipped in favor of Republican candidates—for instance, in 
the 2016 presidential election after the recount St. Croix County gave President Donald Trump about 
55% of its vote and Clark County gave President Trump about 63% of its vote). 
62. Miller, Slaying the Gerrymander, supra note 54.  For an example of Speaker Ryan’s redrawn 
1st Congressional District, compare BLUE BOOK 2009–2010, supra note 59, at 17 (providing a visual 
of Chapter 3 of the 2007–2008 Wisconsin Statutes), with BLUE BOOK 2011–2012, supra note 45, at 
17 (providing a visual of the new congressional districts enacted by 2011 Wisconsin Act 44, which 
shows that Speaker Ryan absorbed more of Waukesha County).  See also Gilbert, Red & Blue, supra 
note 9, at 17 (mentioning that Waukesha County was one of the “three of the highest-performing 
Republican counties in America” in 2012).  For examples of complete election results, see 2012 Fall 
General Election, WIS. ELECTIONS COMM’N (Nov. 6, 2012), http://elections.wi.gov/elections-
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voting/results/2012/fall-general [https://perma.cc/NTA5-FEDE] and 2014 Fall General Election 
Results, WIS. ELECTIONS COMM’N (Nov. 4, 2014), http://elections.wi.gov/elections-
voting/results/2014/fall-general [https://perma.cc/TL3L-VXLP] (explaining, for example, since 2010, 
Waukesha County has given Republicans sizeable majorities in statewide races, such as giving 
Republican nominee Mitt Romney 67% of the vote in 2012 and Republican Governor Scott Walker 
72% of the vote in 2014). 
63. BLUE BOOK 2009–2010, supra note 59, at 17. 
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There are also many examples of state legislative districts that were drawn 
to give Republican state legislators advantages.  For example, in Republican 
 
64. BLUE BOOK 2011–2012, supra note 45, at 17. 
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State Senator Alberta Darling’s 8th District, not only were several areas of 
Democratic suburbs of northern Milwaukee like Shorewood taken away, but 
also State Senator Darling’s district expanded north to include more parts of 
Ozaukee County like Mequon and Grafton and also expanded west to include 
more of Washington and Waukesha County, which all contain overwhelming 
Republican electorates.65  In another example, Racine and Kenosha were 
packed into only a single State Senate district, which allowed these counties to 
be maneuvered to create a safe district for Republicans to the west and cut out 
Democratic State Senator Bob Wirch.66  In a final example, in what illustrates 
long-term thinking on behalf of Republicans, brothers Senate Majority Leader 
Scott Fitzgerald and former Assembly Speaker Jeff Fitzgerald had a 
congressional district line drawn between their homes.67  In this way, 
Republicans could ensure that they maintain a majority in the Wisconsin 
congressional delegation, because separating the brothers into different 
congressional districts prevents them from competing against one another for a 
congressional district.68  The cut that Democrats took in state legislative 
districts as a result of gerrymandering is evident upon comparing Figures 3 and 











65. Compare BLUE BOOK 2009–2010, supra note 59, at 34, with WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE 
REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 2013–2014, at 34 (Julie Pohlman et al. eds. 
2013) [hereinafter BLUE BOOK 2013–2014].  See also Gilbert, Red & Blue, supra note 9, at 17.  In 
addition to providing a visual of how red Washington, Ozaukee, and Waukesha counties have become 
since the 1980s, Gilbert’s article in a caption states, “In 2012, Washington, Ozaukee, and Waukesha 
were three of the highest-performing Republican counties in America, making metropolitan 
Milwaukee’s urban-suburban voting gap among the biggest in the nation.”  Id.   
66. Miller, Slaying the Gerrymander, supra note 54. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. While it is certainly plausible that there are fewer blue districts because Democrats have 
simply lost elections, the facts demonstrate that despite receiving roughly equal amounts in elections, 
Democrats are awarded fewer seats.  See infra notes 72–73. 
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Figure 3: Wisconsin’s State Legislative Districts Before 2011 







70. Complaint at Ex. 1, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (No. 15-cv-421-
bbc) (illustrating how the 2011 plan deliberately allocated Democratic voters less efficiently than 
Republican voters across the state). 
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Figure 4: Wisconsin’s State Legislative Districts After 2011 





Overall, the 2011 gerrymandering of Wisconsin’s political districts has 
protected Republican lawmakers in Wisconsin and provided them election 
advantages over Democrats.  David Michael Miller sums up the proof:  
[T]he gambit paid off for the Republicans, cementing electoral 
 
71. Id. 
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advantages that will last to 2021.  They claimed five of eight 
congressional seats in 2012 despite winning less than half of 
the state’s votes for Congress.  They also won 55% of 
contested [S]tate Senate seats with only 45% of the vote, and 
57% of Assembly races with 48% of the vote.72 
A visual example of such disproportionate results is seen when comparing Figures 
3 and 4, as the Wisconsin State Assembly has become less blue and redder across 
the state largely due to gerrymandering.  Additionally, even though Democrats 
received 51.4% of the statewide vote in 2012, they only claimed thirty-nine 
Assembly seats, while a roughly equal vote for Republicans in 2014 translated 
into sixty-three seats in the State Assembly.73  Also, while the 2016 general 
election gave the Wisconsin delegation to Congress five Republicans and three 
Democrats, Democratic contenders won 1,379,996 votes to 1,270,279 earned by 
Republican candidates.74  
In sum, in the summer of 2011 Wisconsin Republican lawmakers engaged 
in a partisan gerrymandering that has and will influence Wisconsin elections 
and policymaking for at least the remainder of this decennial period.75  
Wisconsin’s 2011 partisan redistricting could even shape the fundamentals of 
elections around the nation, as the state’s 2011 redistricting cycle has rekindled 
the debate regarding the constitutionality of gerrymandering by stirring 
litigation that has resulted in a case before the U.S. Supreme Court in October 
2017.76 
E. The Unconstitutionality of Wisconsin’s Gerrymandered Political Districts  
Over the course of history, the Supreme Court has placed the law governing 
political gerrymandering “in a state of considerable flux” by handing down 
inconsistent opinions and not articulating a clear governing rule on the matter.77  
 
72. Miller, Slaying the Gerrymander, supra note 54. 
73. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 899, 901 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
74. John Nichols, John Nichols: Resolved for 2017: End Gerrymandering of Wisconsin, CAP 
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017), http://host.madison.com/ct/opinion/column/john_nichols/john-nichols-resolved-
for-end-gerrymandering-of-wisconsin/article_84e1bd45-7292-5a08-b33b-3664401e6530.html 
[https://perma.cc/B6VA-R5VF] [hereinafter Nichols, End Gerrymandering of Wisconsin].  
75. Miller, Slaying the Gerrymander, supra note 54; see Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 864. 
76. Barnes, Supreme Court to Hear Potentially Landmark Case on Gerrymandering, supra note 
3. 
77. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 883.  However, the Whitford court did acknowledge that “the 
Supreme Court recognized that the constitutionality of legislative apportionments is governed by the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 864; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533, 585 (1964).  Furthermore, Judge Ripple’s opinion did give an in-depth overview of the case law 
history governing legislative apportionments and political gerrymandering, which helps a reader 
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As a result, there has been a split amongst courts around the nation,78 and the 
Court has really only left open the possibility that a workable standard could be 
identified in future litigation.79  The Western District of Wisconsin in Whitford 
v. Gill set forth such a standard that the Supreme Court could adopt to finally 
hold that a gerrymander is unconstitutional for favoring one political party over 
another.80 
In a ruling that really was the first of its kind, a panel of three judges on 
November 21, 2016, held that Wisconsin’s 2011 redrawing of State Assembly 
districts, as provided in Act 43, constituted an unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymander.81  In particular, in a 2-to-1 ruling, the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Wisconsin determined that the remapping of the state 
legislative districts violated the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause 
 
understand the constant flux of the law.  Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 863–883.  For instance, Judge 
Ripple describes how Davis v. Bandemer—the first case in which the Supreme Court directly addressed 
a claim that redistricting discriminated against members of a political party—provided meaningful 
guidance in three ways: 
First, the Court’s one-person, one-vote and vote-dilution cases provide the 
foundation for evaluating claims of political gerrymandering.  Second, that a 
“claim is submitted by a political group rather than a racial group, does not 
distinguish it in terms of justiciability.”  And, third, a successful political 
gerrymandering claim must include a showing of both discriminatory intent and 
discriminatory effect. 
Id. at 868, 871–72 (citations omitted) (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986)).  
However, Judge Ripple further discusses how in Vieth v. Jubelirer in 2004 “the members of the Court 
were unanimous only in their willingness to jettison the test set forth in Bandemer.”  Id. at 877.  
Therefore, the Whitford court concluded that the test articulated in Bandemer for gerrymandering “no 
longer is good law” and was unworkable.  Id. at 877.  Specifically, the court mentions that the Vieth 
plurality, in discussing the shortcomings of the Bandemer test, describes how “no judicially discernible 
and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged.  Lacking 
[such standards] . . . political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and . . . Bandemer was wrongly 
decided.”  Id. at 872 (first and third alterations in original) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 
281 (2004)).  Judge Ripple notes how the decision of Vieth “has placed district courts in an even greater 
quandary.”  Id. at 877.  One fact contributing to the lack of consistency is that many of the major cases 
that the Supreme Court has heard regarding political gerrymandering, including Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 
(2004), were decided by a plurality.  See Graham Deese, District Court Evaluates New Standard for 
Gerrymandering, WISCONSINWATCHDOG.ORG (July 20, 2016), http://watchdog.org/270792/whitford-
nichol-efficiency-gap [https://perma.cc/H67U-WVC2] [hereinafter Deese, Evaluates New Standard].  
78. Deese, Evaluates New Standard, supra note 77. 
79. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015) 
(citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
80. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884. 
81. Id. at 843; Wines, Wisconsin Redistricting Favored Republicans, supra note 4. 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment because it aimed to, and actually did, deprive 
Democratic voters of their right to be represented.82   
This decision is remarkable because a federal court had never before struck 
down political district boundaries on grounds that they unfairly advantage one 
political party over another.83  In fact, many district courts even began to 
question the validity of the cause of action.84  So, Whitford is so momentous 
because for the first time a court articulated the elements for a cause of action 
for unconstitutional political redistricting and also set forth a clear 
mathematical formula for measuring partisanship in a district.85  As one 
commentator noted, “For years, everyone has waited for the Supreme Court to 
do something on this front.  Now one of the lower courts has jump-started the 
 
82. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 838, 884. 
83. Wines, Wisconsin Redistricting Favored Republicans, supra note 4. 
84. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 890; see also Deese, Evaluates New Standard, supra note 77 
(asserting that because the Supreme Court “has yet to create a set of standards for lower courts to use 
when they evaluate partisan gerrymandering claims,” and has also delivered “inconclusive opinions,” 
lower courts have reached different conclusions as they are left to search for a workable standard that 
the Supreme Court might eventually adopt to rule that a redistricting scheme is unconstitutional). 
85. Wines, Wisconsin Redistricting Favored Republicans, supra note 4; see also Whitford, 218 
F. Supp. 3d at 883–910.  The mathematical formula applied by the Western District was the efficiency 
gap—“the difference between the parties’ respective wasted votes, divided by the total number of votes 
cast in the election.”  Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and 
the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 851 (2015) [hereinafter Stephanopoulos & McGhee, 
Efficiency Gap].  After the wasted votes for each party are totaled, the difference between the wasted 
votes of each party, divided by the total number of votes cast in the election, makes the efficiency gap.  
Id. at 851–52.  An efficiency gap of zero means that the parties wasted votes at a similar rate.  Whitford, 
218 F. Supp. 3d at 854.  In Whitford, experts testified that based on actual election results, “Republicans 
scored an efficiency gap rating of 11.69 percent to 13 percent in the first election after the maps were 
redrawn,” illustrating that the maps achieved their intent to give Republicans a great advantage in 
elections.  Wines, Wisconsin Redistricting Favored Republicans, supra note 4.  Stephanopoulos and 
McGhee provide an example of how to calculate the efficiency gap in Figure 1.  Stephanopoulos & 
McGhee, Efficiency Gap, supra at 852 (Calculation of the Efficiency Gap); see also Whitford, 218 F. 
Supp. 3d at 903–04 (“The [efficiency gap] calculation is relatively simple.  First, it requires totaling, 
for each party, statewide, (1) the number of votes cast for the losing candidates in district races (as a 
measure of cracked voters), along with (2) the number of votes cast for the winning candidates in 
excess of the 50% plus one votes necessary to secure the candidate’s victory (as a measure of packed 
voters).  The resulting figure is the total number of ‘wasted’ votes for each party.  These wasted vote 
totals are not, of themselves, independently significant for EG purposes; rather, it is the comparative 
relationship of one party’s wasted votes to another’s that yields the EG measure.” (alterations in 
original) (footnotes omitted)); Wines, Wisconsin Redistricting Favored Republicans, supra note 4 
(“The formula divides the difference between the two parties’ ‘wasted votes’—votes beyond those 
needed by a winning side, and votes cast by a losing side—by the total number of votes cast.  When 
both parties waste the same number of votes, the result is zero—an ideal solution.  But as a winning 
party wastes fewer and fewer votes than its opponent, its score rises.”). 
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debate.”86  The Whitford court stated the elements for a cause of action for 
partisan gerrymandering as follows:  
[T]he First Amendment and the Equal Protection clause 
prohibit a redistricting scheme which (1) is intended to place a 
severe impediment on the effectiveness of the votes of 
individual citizens on the basis of their political affiliation, (2) 
has that effect, and (3) cannot be justified on other, legitimate 
legislative grounds.87 
Ultimately, applying this standard, Whitford ruled that “Act 43 burdens the 
representational rights of Democratic voters in Wisconsin by” hindering their 
ability to turn votes into legislative seats for the life of Act 43.88  
Before Wisconsin Attorney General Brad Schimel filed an appeal to the 
U.S. Supreme Court on February 24, 2017,89 the Whitford court on January 27, 
2017, handed down a remedy to address the unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymander of Act 43: in accordance with the principles set forth in Whitford 
and contingent upon the Supreme Court’s affirmance of the decision, the state 
legislature had until November 1, 2017, to enact a new redistricting map.90  
However, on June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the 
appeal during its October 2017 term and voted to stay the Western District’s 
remedy.91 
Now that Whitford is on the books, a workable standard has been 
established.  This case can serve to halt the flux of the legal principles that has 
thus far guided, or actually misguided, partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence 
and finally provide the rationale that several justices have been looking for to 
strike down partisan gerrymanders.92  If the Supreme Court affirms the Whitford 
holding, it would be a landmark ruling in election law.  This is because such a 
 
86. Wines, Wisconsin Redistricting Favored Republicans, supra note 4 (quoting Heather 
Gerken, Yale Law School professor and expert on election law). 
87. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884. 
88. Id. at 910. 
89. See Defendant’s Notice of Appeal, Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (No. 15-cv-421-bbc). 
90. See Opinion and Order at 7, Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (No. 15-cv-00421-bbc) (enjoining 
defendants from using the districting scheme of Act 43 and requiring that defendants craft a remedial 
redistricting plan for the November 2018 election). 
91. Barnes, Supreme Court to Hear Potentially Landmark Case on Gerrymandering, supra note 
3. 
92. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 883; Wines, Wisconsin Redistricting Favored Republicans, 
supra note 4; Barnes, Supreme Court to Hear Potentially Landmark Case on Gerrymandering, supra 
note 3 (describing how Justice Kennedy has written that he has been waiting for “a manageable 
standard by which to measure the effect of the apportionment and so to conclude that the state did 
impose a burden or restriction on the rights of a party’s voters.”). 
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ruling would have a profound effect not only on Wisconsin redistricting, but 
also on altering the way in which district boundaries are crafted in all states 
across the nation.  Whitford also serves as a great step in curtailing 
gerrymandering in Wisconsin by setting forth a standard to determine when 
partisan gerrymandering has become too much to unconstitutionally dilute the 
voice of voters.93  If anything, Whitford stands for the proposition that 
ideological neutrality in redistricting is key because it is the baseline measure 
that can produce a robust democracy by drawing districts that stir competition 
rather than adhere to political extremes.94  In this way, this decision can be used 
to argue that reforming Wisconsin’s redistricting process is necessary to ensure 
that voters of each party have a fair chance at achieving reasonable 
representation in legislatures and prevent one party from potentially 
maintaining perpetual power within the state. 
III. FRAMEWORKS ADOPTED BY OTHER STATES TO CURTAIL 
GERRYMANDERING: INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS 
While many states such as Wisconsin continue to rely on its legislature to 
reapportion political districts after each census, there has been a growing 
movement by other states to give redistricting power to an independent, neutral 
entity typically referred to as an independent commission.95  In fact, according 
to the National Conference of State Legislatures, as of 2015, twenty-four states 
have implemented some form of a commission for drawing political districts96 
in which state legislators relinquish redistricting authority to nonpartisan or 
bipartisan commissions.97 
Recently, the Supreme Court acknowledged and affirmed a state’s ability 
to enact independent, neutral bodies in order to prevent partisan 
gerrymandering.  In 2015 in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
 
93. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884. 
94. See generally 218 F. Supp. 3d 837.  
95. Id. at 844. 
96. Redistricting Commissions: State Legislative Plans, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/2009-redistricting-
commissions-table.aspx [https://perma.cc/4S4H-EQ9P] [hereinafter Redistricting Commissions, 
NCSL].  This web page provides a chart of the various commissions that different states employ, and 
it states that “[t]hirteen states have a commission with primary responsibility for drawing a plan for 
state legislative districts.  Five states have an advisory commission that may assist the legislature with 
drawing the district lines and five states have a backup commission that will make the decision if the 
legislature is unable to agree.”  Id.  Also, “Iowa’s redistricting plan . . . is distinct from the other 
categories.”  Id. 
97. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2015). 
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Redistricting Commission, the Court held that “the Elections Clause permits the 
people of Arizona to provide for redistricting by independent commission.”98  
This holding is significant because it demonstrates the Supreme Court’s 
acceptance of states using independent commissions to curtail partisan 
gerrymandering.  So, in addition to Whitford, the fact that more states are 
adopting commissions along with the Court’s approval of such commissions 
are other indications that momentum is growing for Wisconsin to follow suit 
and reform its redistricting framework by adopting a commission of its own.  
The following is an examination of three examples of independent commissions 
or neutral redistricting bodies that other states already employ. 
A. Iowa: The Legislative Services Agency and the Redistricting Advisory 
Commission 
“Iowa conducts redistricting unlike any other state,”99 and its framework 
for redistricting state legislative and congressional districts is codified in 
Chapter 42 of the Iowa Code.100  Once population data from the Census Bureau 
is delivered to the state, the task of preparing congressional and state legislative 
political boundaries is the responsibility of the Legislative Services Agency 
(LSA).101  The LSA consists of “[n]onpartisan legislative staff” who “develop 
maps for the Iowa House and Senate as well as U.S. House districts without 
any political or election data including the addresses of incumbents.”102  
Specifically, the LSA can consider only population data when redrawing 
political districts,103 and it must draw the districts so that they “have a 
population as nearly equal as practicable to the ideal population for such 
 
98. Id. at 2671.  The Court reached this holding largely because it determined that under 
Arizona’s Constitution, the electorate shares lawmaking authority with the state legislature.  Id.; see 
ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1 (“The legislative authority of the state shall be vested in the legislature, 
consisting of a senate and a house of representatives, but the people reserve the power to propose laws 
and amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject such laws and amendments at the polls, 
independently of the legislature . . . .”); see also id. art. XXII, § 14 (“Any law which may be enacted 
by the Legislature . . . may be enacted by the people under the Initiative.”). 
99. Redistricting Commissions, NCSL, supra note 96. 
100. IOWA CODE § 42 (2017). 
101. Id. § 42.2(3). 
102. Redistricting Commissions, NCSL, supra note 96.  Professor Justin Levitt states that the 
LSA is an advisory body comprised of “civil servants committed to nonpartisanship and otherwise 
charged with tasks like legal and fiscal analysis of state legislation and state government oversight.”  
Justin Levitt, Iowa, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/states-IA.php 
[https://perma.cc/6RS2-7DM5] (last visited Dec. 27, 2016). 
103. See IOWA CODE § 42.4. 
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districts.”104  There are also several geographical requirements that the LSA 
must abide by when constructing the boundaries, including: strict limits on 
dividing counties or cities among more than one district;105 making districts that 
are of “contiguous territory”;106 and the districts “shall be reasonably compact 
in form,” which means that the districts should be “square, rectangular, or 
hexagonal in shape, and not irregularly shaped.”107  Iowa also mandates that 
districts cannot be drawn with any consideration of politics, such as to favor 
any political party or legislator.108 
Upon completion of the plan of the newly drawn state legislative and 
congressional districts, the LSA delivers its plan as a bill to the State Senate 
and Assembly, where the bill is brought to a vote to approve the plan 
“expeditiously” and “under a procedure or rule permitting no amendments 
except those of a purely corrective nature.”109  In this way, while the LSA takes 
the pencil away from the state legislature to draw new district maps, the state 
legislature retains its authority to implement the district maps, as the LSA is 
simply a guide for the state legislature in the redistricting process. 
Moreover, the LSA is assisted and guided by “a five member temporary 
redistricting advisory commission.”110  The majority and minority leaders of 
both the State Senate and Assembly select four members of the redistricting 
advisory commission,111 and these first four commission members select the 
fifth member, who serves as the chairperson.112  Members of the commission 
are reimbursed for the “necessary expenses incurred in performing their 
 
104. Id. § 42.4(1)(a)–(b). 
105. Id. § 42.4(2). 
106. Id. § 42.4(3). 
107. Id. § 42.4(4).  Of course, this provision makes Governor Gerry’s salamander-shaped 
districts illegal in Iowa.  See Hulse, Gerrymandering’s Legacy, supra note 13. 
108. IOWA CODE § 42.4(5) (“No district shall be drawn for the purpose of favoring a political 
party, incumbent legislator or member of Congress, or other person or group, or for the purpose of 
augmenting or diluting the voting strength of a language or racial minority group.  In establishing 
districts, no use shall be made of any of the following data: (a) Addresses of incumbent legislators or 
members of Congress.  (b) Political affiliations of registered voters.  (c) Previous election results.  (d) 
Demographic information, other than population head counts, except as required by the Constitution 
and the laws of the United States.”). 
109. Id. § 42.3(1).  Section 42.3(2) states that if the first bill fails, the LSA prepares another bill 
“embodying a second plan of legislative and congressional districting,” and this process continues until 
a redistricting bill is passed.  See id. § 42.3(2)–(3). 
110. Id. § 42.5(1).  Section 42.6 describes the duties of the commission, such as holding public 
hearings.  See id. § 42.6.  
111. Id. § 42.5(1)(a); see id. § 42.1(4) (defining “Four selecting authorities”). 
112. Id. § 42.5(1)(b). 
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duties,”113 and they cannot hold public office or be related to or employed by a 
legislator who is affected by the new district boundaries.114 
Ultimately, between the LSA and the redistricting advisory commission, 
Iowa has a redistricting scheme that calls for two bodies to work together to 
play an auxiliary role and advise the state legislature on redistricting in a 
nonpartisan manner.115 
B. Arizona: The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 
Having experienced a “troubled redistricting history” since the 1970s, 
Proposition 106 was adopted by citizen initiative in Arizona in 2000 by a 
margin of 56.1% to 43.9%.116  Proposition 106 sought to end Arizona’s 
recurring reapportionment crisis by amending the state’s constitution to remove 
congressional and state legislative redistricting authority from the state 
legislature and convey such power to an entity called the Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission (AIRC).117   
Convening after each census to establish new district boundaries, the AIRC 
consists of five individuals,118 of whom the first four are selected by the highest 
ranking elected officers in each chamber of the state legislature.119  There are 
certain requirements that each member must satisfy in order to be qualified to 
be a member of the AIRC, including: no more than two members of the AIRC 
shall be of the same political party; no more than two of the first four members 
shall reside in the same county; each member must be a registered Arizona 
voter; and each member cannot have served public office, be a registered paid 
lobbyist, or an officer of a political party within three years of appointment.120  
The state’s Commission on Appellate Court Appointments initially narrows the 
potential commission members as it chooses the pool that the chamber 
leadership must choose from.121  At a later meeting after the four original AIRC 
 
113. Id. § 42.5(1)(d). 
114. Id. § 42.5(2)(b)–(c). 
115. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2015) 
(citing IOWA CODE §§ 42.1–42.6 (2013)).  
116. Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 
1830–31 (2012) [hereinafter Cain, Redistricting Commissions]. 
117. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2658. 
118. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3). 
119. Id. § 1(6). 
120. Id. § 1(3). 
121. Id. § 1(5) (“[T]he commission on appellate court appointments or its designee shall establish 
a pool of persons who are willing to serve on and are qualified for appointment to the independent 
redistricting commission.  The pool of candidates shall consist of twenty-five nominees, with ten 
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members are selected, these four members then select from the nomination pool 
a fifth member who is not registered with any party already represented in the 
AIRC.122 
As stated above, the AIRC is given the authority to establish congressional 
and legislative districts for each decennial period.123  In making the maps, the 
AIRC is deprived of certain information in the initial phases of the process, 
such as party registration and voting history data.124  The AIRC must begin by 
creating a “grid-like pattern” across the state, making adjustments only to 
accommodate certain constitutional goals, such as creating districts of roughly 
equal populations.125  Once completed, the draft of the new map is made public 
for comment or even nonbinding recommendations by legislators; then, the 
AIRC must establish the final district boundaries.126   
C. California: The Citizens Redistricting Commission 
In the later 2000s, an influential bipartisan reform coalition called 
California Forward took up the cause to reform California’s redistricting 
scheme.127  Through a popular initiative, California Forward secured passage 
of Proposition 11 and Proposition 20, which covered redistricting for state 
legislative districts and congressional districts, respectively.128  The goal of this 
reform effort was to develop a redistricting framework unlike that adopted by 
other states and to squeeze out every ounce of political influence by creating a 
 
nominees from each of the two largest political parties in Arizona based on party registration, and five 
who are not registered with either of the two largest political parties . . . .”). 
122. Id. § 1(8). 
123. Id. §§ 1(3), (6), (14). 
124. Id. § 1(15). 
125. Id. § 1(14) (“The commencement of the mapping process for both the congressional and 
legislative districts shall be the creation of districts of equal population in a grid-like pattern across the 
state.  Adjustments to the grid shall then be made as necessary to accommodate the goals set forth 
below: (A) Districts shall comply with the United States Constitution and the United States voting 
rights act; (B) Congressional districts shall have equal population to the extent practicable, and state 
legislative districts shall have equal population to the extent practicable; (C) Districts shall be 
geographically compact and contiguous to the extent practicable; (D) District boundaries shall respect 
communities of interest to the extent practicable; (E) To the extent practicable, district lines shall use 
visible geographic features, city, town and county boundaries, and undivided census tracts; (F) To the 
extent practicable, competitive districts should be favored where to do so would create no significant 
detriment to the other goals.”). 
126. Id. § 1(16). 
127. Cain, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 116, at 1823. 
128. Id. 
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scheme comprised of a bipartisan panel of citizens who were disconnected from 
legislators and political data.129 
The result of Propositions 11 and 20 was the Citizens Redistricting 
Commission (CRC).130  Professor Bruce Cain describes the CRC as “a ring of 
defensive tactics, employing multiple approaches to keep political and 
incumbent influences out.”131  In this regard, selecting the fourteen members of 
the CRC involves a fairly elaborate selection process.  First, all registered 
California voters132 are able to apply to serve on the CRC, but certain members 
are automatically removed if they present a particular conflict of interest.133  In 
this manner, any degree of involvement in politics that may impede an 
individual’s impartiality and indifference is uprooted from the process.134  
Then, after the State Auditor selects an Applicant Review Panel made up of 
three qualified independent auditors who have the responsibility of screening 
the applicants to the CRC,135 the panel, with consideration of impartiality and 
 
129. Id. at 1823–24. 
130. See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 8251–8253.6 (West 2017); CAL. CONST. art. XXI. 
131. Cain, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 116, at 1824. 
132. GOV’T § 8252(a).  CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(3) actually requires that: 
Each commission member shall be a voter who has been continuously registered 
in California with the same political party or unaffiliated with a political party 
and who has not changed political party affiliation for five or more years 
immediately preceding the date of his or her appointment.  Each commission 
member shall have voted in two of the last three statewide general elections 
immediately preceding his or her application. 
133. GOV’T § 8252(a)(2) (“The State Auditor shall remove from the applicant pool individuals 
with conflicts of interest including: (A) Within the 10 years immediately preceding the date of 
application, neither the applicant, nor a member of his or her immediate family, may have done any of 
the following: (i) Been appointed to, elected to, or have been a candidate for federal or state office.  (ii) 
Served as an officer, employee, or paid consultant of a political party or of the campaign committee of 
a candidate for elective federal or state office.  (iii) Served as an elected or appointed member of a 
political party central committee.  (iv) Been a registered federal, state, or local lobbyist.  (v) Served as 
paid congressional, legislative, or State Board of Equalization staff.  (vi) Contributed two thousand 
dollars ($2,000) or more to any congressional, state, or local candidate for elective public office in any 
year, which shall be adjusted every 10 years by the cumulative change in the California Consumer 
Price Index, or its successor.  (B) Staff and consultants to, persons under a contract with, and any 
person with an immediate family relationship with the Governor, a Member of the Legislature, a 
Member of Congress, or a member of the State Board of Equalization, are not eligible to serve as 
commission members. As used in this subdivision, a member of a person’s ‘immediate family’ is one 
with whom the person has a bona fide relationship established through blood or legal relation, including 
parents, children, siblings, and in-laws.”). 
134. Cain, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 116, at 1824. 
135. GOV’T § 8252(b) (“The State Auditor shall randomly draw names from a pool consisting 
of all qualified independent auditors.  The State Auditor shall draw until the names of three qualified 
independent auditors have been drawn, including one who is registered with the largest political party 
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diversity, selects sixty of the most qualified applicants.136  This is evenly broken 
up between individuals who are registered with the largest political party in the 
state, individuals who are registered with the second largest party in California, 
and individuals who are not registered with either of the two largest parties in 
California.137  Then, leadership from the State Senate and Assembly can each 
strike two applicants from each sub pool.138  Next, eight names from the 
remaining pool are drawn at random so that three are from the largest party, 
three from the second largest party, and two are nonregistered individuals.139  
These eight individuals then appoint six other members to the commission from 
the remaining names, in accordance with keeping the proportionate balance 
between the parties.140  Thus, ultimately, the CRC is made up of fourteen 
individuals from the California general public who are registered California 
voters rather than people who are selected by members of the state 
legislature.141  However, the CRC can hire staff and consultants as needed,142 
the membership is compensated for their services,143 and also the members 
cannot communicate with anyone outside of a public hearing other than the 
consultants that they retain.144 
The CRC is constitutionally responsible for drawing district boundaries in 
a manner that follows the requirements specified in the California 
Constitution.145  For example, the constitution explicitly states that the districts 
cannot be drawn in a way that favors or dilutes a political party or an 
 
in California based on party registration, one who is registered with the second largest political party 
in California based on party registration, and one who is not registered with either of the two largest 
political parties in California.”). 
136. Id. § 8252(d).  
137. Id. 
138. Id. § 8252(e). 
139. Id. § 8252(f). 
140. Id. § 8252(g). 
141. Id. § 8252(b), (d)–(g).  
142. Id. § 8253(a)(5). 
143. Id. § 8253.5 (“Members of the commission shall be compensated at the rate of three hundred 
dollars ($300) for each day the member is engaged in commission business.”). 
144. Id. § 8253(a)(3). 
145. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(b), (d) (stating in section 2(d) that the single-member districts 
for the State Senate, Assembly, and Congress shall be of roughly equal population; must comply with 
the Voting Rights Act; must be contiguous; must minimize the division of cities and counties; and must 
be geographically compact). 
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incumbent.146  Ultimately, after the CRC approves its final maps, the new maps 
become effective upon approval by a public referendum.147   
D. Critiquing Independent Commissions Already Employed by Other States 
It is promising that nearly half of the states are beginning to implement and 
employ various types of independent bodies to curtail partisan gerrymandering 
by taking away such authority, or at least the bulk of it, from partisan state 
legislatures.148  In fact, such commissions have been successful in many ways, 
as studies show that they draw their maps in a timely manner and create 
competitive boundaries.149  Even California’s experiment of relying on citizens 
to draw the maps had some success as the CRC, which was fairly diverse with 
respect to gender, age, and ethnicity, produced districts that were more compact 
and more competitive than the districts of the previous decennial period.150 
However, despite successes, the commissions currently employed exhibit 
several flaws, indicating that the new schemes are not totally fair, unbiased, or 
nonpartisan, and thus may even create maps that run afoul with the Whitford 
standard.  For example, the primary cause for concern of many commissions is 
whether “the seal on legislative interference and control is tight enough.”151  For 
instance, as seen in the examples of commissions provided above, leadership in 
the state legislatures of Iowa, Arizona, New Jersey, Alaska, Colorado, and 
many other states are involved in choosing at least a portion of the 
commission’s members—typically the first of the commission’s members are 
selected by the leadership of both houses of the bicameral state legislature.152  
 
146. Id. § 2(e). 
147. Id. § 2(g)–(j); see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. 
Ct. 2652, 2662 (2015). 
148. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2662 (“Several other States, as a means to curtail 
partisan gerrymandering, have also provided for the participation of commissions in redistricting.”); 
Redistricting Commissions, NCSL, supra note 96. 
149. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2662 (citing Peter Miller & Bernard Grofman, 
Redistricting Commissions in the Western United States, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 637, 661, 663–64, 666 
(2013)). 
150. Cain, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 116, at 1825, 1827. 
151. Id. at 1835. 
152. See IOWA CODE § 42.5(1)(a) (2017) (“Each of the four selecting authorities shall certify to 
the chief election officer the authority’s appointment of a person to serve on the commission.”);  id. § 
42.1(4) (including the majority and minority floor leaders of the State Senate and State House of 
Representatives as the “[f]our selecting authorities”); ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(6) 
(“Appointments to the independent redistricting commission shall be made in the order set forth 
below. . . . [T]he highest ranking officer elected by the Arizona house of representatives shall make 
one appointment to the independent redistricting commission from the pool of nominees, followed by 
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In addition, even though California’s CRC tries to take politicians completely 
out of the process, the leaders of both parties in both houses of the state 
legislature are still involved as they are able to strike applicants from the 
pool.153  Granting legislators the capacity to influence or even directly choose 
who can be a part of the bipartisan or neutral redistricting commission can 
actually infuse partisanship into the process, preventing the redistricting 
process from being insulated from political partisanship.154  So, even though 
most commissions seek to have equal representation of both political parties 
and aim to prohibit the inner political world from serving, state legislators with 
authority to appoint members to the commission can politic and choose 
politically strong-willed or extremely partisan individuals who will fight for 
their party in the redistricting process, perhaps tipping the scale of partisanship 
of the commission in their favor.155 
Additionally, many commissions also mandate that the membership choose 
the commission’s remaining members who ought to be independent or not 
registered with any major political party to keep the bipartisan makeup of the 
commission equal.156  Here lies another opportunity for partisanship to enter the 
process.  One party represented on the commission can try to tip the balance of 
power of the commission in their favor by seeking a member who, for instance, 
 
one appointment from the pool made in turn by each of the following: the minority party leader of the 
Arizona house of representatives, the highest ranking officer elected by the Arizona senate, and the 
minority party leader of the Arizona senate.”); N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2, ¶ 1(b) (“There shall first be 
appointed 12 members as follows: (1) two members to be appointed by the President of the Senate; (2) 
two members to be appointed by the Speaker of the General Assembly; (3) two members to be 
appointed by the minority leader of the Senate; (4) two members to be appointed by the minority leader 
of the General Assembly; and (5) four members, two to be appointed by the chairman of the State 
committee of the political party whose candidate for the office of Governor received the largest number 
of votes at the most recent gubernatorial election and two to be appointed by the chairman of the State 
committee of the political party whose candidate for the office of Governor received the next largest 
number of votes in that election.”). For other examples, see ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8(a)–(b); COLO. 
CONST. art. V, § 48; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2(2); ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1-A.  Other states, such 
as Arkansas and Ohio, even have politicians serving on the commission, such as the governor and 
secretary of state.  See ARK. CONST. art. 8, §§ 1, 4; OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1; PA. CONST. art. II, § 17. 
153. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(e) (West 2017). 
154. See Cain, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 116, at 1836. 
155. See generally Cain, supra note 116.  
156. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(8) (“[T]he four independent redistricting 
commission members shall select by majority vote from the nomination pool a fifth member who shall 
not be registered with any party already represented on the independent redistricting commission and 
who shall serve as chair.”); see also GOV’T § 8252(g) (“[T]he eight commissioners shall review the 
remaining names in the subpools of applicants and appoint six applicants to the commission.”). 
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is secretly partisan.157  For example, the fifth member of Arizona’s AIRC, 
chosen by the first four members, is independent and acts as chair and the 
tiebreaker vote; if this person is secretly partisan, the legitimacy of the whole 
system unwinds.158  In 2011, Arizona faced some of these fears as Republicans 
alleged that the independent chair politicked on behalf of Democrats and helped 
produce maps that made some Republican seats more competitive.159 
Another flaw in many redistricting commissions is that the legislature still 
retains some capacity to interfere in the commission’s operations.  For instance, 
most states employing redistricting commissions stipulate that a commission 
member can be removed based on certain conduct such as “neglect of duty,” 
“inability to discharge the duties of office,” or “gross misconduct in office.”160  
While such provisions are valuable checks to prevent an abuse of power or 
unqualified individuals from serving on the commissions, their existence 
nevertheless leaves open the prospect of compromising the commission’s 
independence from political influence.161  For example, Professor Cain 
describes how tensions can arise between the redistricting commission and the 
majority party when the majority party is not happy with how the lines are 
drawn.162  He provides an example of how Governor Jan Brewer of Arizona 
tried to remove the chairwoman of the AIRC—a registered independent named 
Colleen C. Mathis—along with the two Democrats on the panel, for gross 
misconduct when Ms. Mathis was alleged to have concealed her Democratic 
leaning and proposed lines that unfairly disadvantaged Republicans, who were 
the majority party at the time.163  Moreover, in states such as California and 
Arizona, the commissions have to rely on the legislature for funding before, 
during, and after the redistricting process.164  This becomes problematic 
because various aspects of the reapportionment process can extend for years 
even after the commission’s work is complete, and tensions can arise if funding 
 
157. Cain, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 116, at 1832–34. 
158. Id. at 1833–34. 
159. Id. at 1834. 
160. See GOV’T § 8252.5(a); see also ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(10). 
161. Cain, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 116, at 1836. 
162. See generally id. 
163. Id. at 1832, 1836; see also Marc Lacey, Arizona Senate, at Governor’s Urging, Ousts Chief 
of Redistricting Panel, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/us/arizona-
republicans-oust-colleen-mathis-head-of-redistricting-panel.html [https://perma.cc/354P-D76U] 
(“Ms. Brewer accused Ms. Mathis, who is registered as an independent, of improperly conducting 
commission business out of public view and of skewing the redistricting process toward Democrats.”). 
164. Cain, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 116, at 1835. 
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is still required but a majority knows, and is not satisfied with, the newly drawn 
political boundaries.165 
Another flaw in many redistricting commissions is a lack of sufficient 
guidelines about the legal staff and consultants that the commission members 
can retain.166  For instance, California gives the CRC members authority to 
appoint technical and legal staff to aide them in the process; however, other 
than providing the same limits on political insiders from getting involved, it 
provides no effective provisions or guideposts to limit or guide such a decision, 
such as placing limits on the party affiliation of staff.167  Professor Cain 
describes this predicament:  
Most redistricting consultants have worked for one or the other 
party, which, given the political sensitivity of the task, is 
understandable.  Similarly, most lawyers who specialize in 
voting rights cases or redistricting tend to align with one party 
or the other.  If the commission is balanced by party affiliation, 
then should the staff be also?  Would a bipartisan staff even be 
able to work together harmoniously?168 
Considering this, similar to the themes of the previous paragraphs, placing no 
limits on the partisanship of staff employed by the commission is another 
illustration of how the lid on partisanship is not completely sealed on independent 
commissions.169 
Lastly, another concern worth mentioning is that some commissions simply 
consist of too many individuals.  For instance, California’s CRC consists of 
fourteen members,170 New Jersey’s commission consists of thirteen 
members,171 and Colorado’s commission contains eleven individuals.172  While 
it can be valuable to get more insight into the redrawing process, this can make 
the group more exposed to the dangers of “groupthink”—“[d]ysfunctional 
collective decision making characterized by a strong sense of a group’s moral 
righteousness, closed-mindedness, and pressures toward conformity.”173  In this 
 
165. Id. at 1835 (providing an example of how 63% of the total budget of the 2001 AIRC was 
spent after 2002, and also how litigation alone cost the most recent CRC nearly $3,000,000). 
166. Id. at 1834–35. 
167. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8253(a)(5) (West 2017). 
168. Cain, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 116, at 1835 (footnote omitted). 
169. See id. 
170. See GOV’T § 8252. 
171. N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2, ¶ 1(a). 
172. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48. 
173. STEVEN W. HOOK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: THE PARADOX OF WORLD POWER 97, 433 (4th 
ed. 2014). 
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way, generally, the larger the group is the more likely the dangers of groupthink 
will become apparent, as one person or a small group within the group can 
control the agenda of the commission, making others reluctant to give their 
input or question the decisions of the group.174  This can be particularly 
dangerous should the individual or group dominating the group have partisan 
intentions, as this would infuse partisanship into the process.175 
Ultimately, while it is certainly promising that there is a growing movement 
in the United States towards redistricting reform in favor of independent, 
bipartisan redistricting commissions, the result thus far for many states has been 
an imperfect system leaving too many holes for partisanship to leak into the 
process.176  Such holes and flaws are not only concerning for practical or 
political reasons, but are also concerning because they still leave the door open 
for unconstitutional gerrymandering under the Whitford framework.  The only 
difference would be that an independent commission instead of the state 
legislature committed the constitutional violation.  So, Wisconsin needs 
something further than what other states have done to tighten the lid on 
partisanship in order to effectively curtail gerrymandering.   
IV. A UNIQUE REDISTRICTING FRAMEWORK FOR WISCONSIN: THE 
WISCONSIN IMPARTIAL CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION 
Wisconsin’s redistricting process needs to be reformed.  However, given 
the flaws of various commissions as discussed in the previous section as well 
as the unique political climate of Wisconsin, Wisconsin requires an approach 
that is unique in order to effectively curtail partisan gerrymandering.  After 
2011 redistricting, it is also evident that the state cannot rely on its partisan 
officials to run the process.177  Therefore, Wisconsin should adopt something 
similar to California’s CRC and rely on its citizenry. 
However, in recent history, Wisconsin has grown to become a “hotbed of 
partisan division [and] a hotbed of political activism. . . . [T]wo phenomena 
[which] reinforce each other.”178  This phenomenon is apparent in numerous 
ways.  For example, Wisconsin is a prime example of a battleground state, as, 
in statewide elections over the past decade, Wisconsin has flipped between 
electing candidates who are not only of opposing political parties, but also has 
flipped between candidates who have drastically different political ideologies 
 
174. See id. at 97. 
175. See id. 
176. See Cain, Redistricting Commission, supra note 116, at 1812, 1841–42. 
177. See Wines, Wisconsin Redistricting Favored Republicans, supra note 4. 
178. Gilbert, Red & Blue, supra note 9, at 16. 
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and philosophies.179  On top of these remarkable and varying statewide voting 
patterns, Wisconsinites have also become much more engaged in politics than 
the average American citizen.180  This includes not only producing record-
breaking voter turnouts in elections over the past decade, but also relatively 
high and increasing participation in a variety of political activities, such as 
making campaign contributions, attending political rallies, and displaying yard 
signs and bumper stickers.181  Considering these facts, Wisconsin continues to 
become one of the most active and polarized states in the nation.182  Given the 
significant and growing political participation and activism of Wisconsinites, 
Wisconsin voters are generally more politically biased as they have developed 
deep, fiery, and passionate views on politics and government, and perhaps are 
also generally more aware of the political makeup and climate of the state.183  
So, given the rather noteworthy partisan divide and active political climate of 
the voters of Wisconsin, a framework that would rely on registered voters to 
redraw political districts could still risk tainting the process with partisanship 
or political biases.  
For the foregoing reasons, Wisconsin should call for an approach unlike 
what other states have already adopted to minimize the likelihood of 
gerrymandering: utilizing laypersons to the political process in a commission 
 
179. Evidence of Wisconsin flipping in statewide elections is apparent based on recent election 
results.  In November 2008, Democratic President Barack Obama defeated Republican presidential 
candidate John McCain 56.22% to 42.31%.  2008 Fall General Election Results, WIS. ELECTIONS 
COMM’N (Nov. 4, 2008), http://elections.wi.gov/elections-voting/results/2008/fall-general 
[https://perma.cc/3KPR-RBNG].  Then in November 2010 Republican Governor Scott Walker 
defeated Democratic governor candidate Tom Barrett 52.25% to 46.48%, 2010 Fall General Election 
Results, supra note 53; and also in 2010 Republican U.S. Senator Ron Johnson defeated three-time 
Democratic U.S. Senator Russ Feingold with 51.86% of the vote.  Id.  In 2012 Governor Scott Walker 
survived a recall challenge against Democratic challenger Tom Barrett with 53.08% of the vote, 2012 
Recall Election for Governor, Lt. Governor and State Senator, WIS. ELECTIONS COMM’N (June 5, 
2012), http://elections.wi.gov/elections-voting/results/2012/recall-election [https://perma.cc/864R-
XTLZ], but in the same year Democratic President Barack Obama defeated his Republican challenger 
Mitt Romney in Wisconsin with 52.83% of the vote, 2012 Fall General Election, supra note 62, and 
Democratic U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin defeated Republican candidate Tommy Thompson with 
51.41% of the vote.  Id.  Since 2014, however, Wisconsin has remained red in statewide elections.  In 
2014, Republican Governor Scott Walker won with 52.26% against his Democratic challenger, 2014 
Fall General Election Results, supra note 62, and then in 2016 Republican U.S. Senator Ron Johnson 
defeated his Democratic challenger with 50.17% and President Donald Trump defeated Democratic 
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton in Wisconsin by a vote of 47.22% to 46.45%.  2016 Fall General 
Election Results, supra note 61.   
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called the Wisconsin Impartial Citizens Redistricting Commissions (WICRC).  
These laypersons include citizens who do not vote or who seldom vote.  
A. The Logic Behind the Wisconsin Impartial Citizens Redistricting 
Commission 
As discussed above, Wisconsin is both unique and extreme in its political 
activism and partisanship; therefore, in order to adequately and effectively 
curtail gerrymandering, Wisconsin needs a creative solution that goes even 
further than California’s CRC at squeezing out every hint of partisanship and 
political bias that is toxic to our democracy.184  Wisconsin should amend its 
constitution to give district drawing power to a commission of ideologically 
dispassionate citizens who do not vote or who seldom vote.   
1. Affirmative Arguments Justifying and Supporting the Wisconsin Impartial 
Citizens Redistricting Commission 
The logic behind the membership of the WICRC is that voting history, or 
lack thereof, can be used as a good proxy for ideological neutrality.  So, from 
this it follows that a nonvoter would be ideologically dispassionate as compared 
to someone who regularly votes.  Relying on nonvoters to redraw political 
boundaries is unquestionably unique and perhaps even counter-intuitive; 
however, the Supreme Court has advanced the principle that states can 
implement novel policies to address different issues because they are 
laboratories for democracy: 
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a 
grave responsibility.  Denial of the right to experiment may be 
fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.  It is one of 
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.185 
Therefore, although it might be adopting something that appears out of the 
mainstream, states ought to take unique approaches to try to find adequate and 
effective ways to fix problems and address important issues that its citizens 
 
184. See Cain, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 116, at 1824 (arguing that the goal of 
California’s experiment was to develop a redistricting framework unlike that adopted by other states 
to squeeze out every ounce of political influence by creating a scheme comprised of a bipartisan panel 
of citizens who were disconnected from legislators and political data in order to maximize fairness, 
competition, and impartiality). 
185. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
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endure.186  So, Wisconsin could serve as a laboratory to effectively curtail 
gerrymandering by relying on its nonvoting citizens to craft political districts.   
Members of the population who do not vote or who seldom vote are 
quintessential individuals to serve on a body that is aimed at removing all traces 
of partisan politics from the process because a lack of a voting record can be 
used as a good proxy for ideological neutrality.  This is because nonvoters are 
most likely impartial, indifferent, apolitical, or simply have no particular 
opinion on the subject, as they are probably disillusioned from the political 
process, are unaware of political climates, or frankly just do not care about 
politics.  One commentator wrote:  
But some people just don’t care about politics, which can 
lead to voter apathy.  And if a social group doesn’t regard 
politics as very important, its members may not bother to 
vote . . . .  In fact, . . . one might argue that in terms of any one 
citizen, “it makes no sense to vote.”  Only very rarely has a 
single vote changed the outcome of an election.  And where 
that happened, it usually was only in very small, local 
elections.   
Not only that, where elections occur often, people may 
experience voter burnout.  “One of the things that makes the 
U.S. strange is that there’s a lot of elections . . . .  We ask voters 
to make a lot of decisions.”  Getting out to the polls can be a 
hassle.  What’s more, learning about every single issue takes 
time.  If people are asked to vote too often, or choose a position 
on too many subjects, they might just opt out of the whole 
process.  “We have a complicated system and . . . that produces 
fatigue.”187  
Given that nonvoters or seldom voters are likely ideologically indifferent, they 
would be ideal individuals to serve on a commission tasked with drawing political 
boundaries without a political mindset or partisan endeavors.   
Finding who has and who has not voted is not a difficult task.  According 
to the Wisconsin Administrative Code, “The official registration list shall be 
open to public inspection,”188 and so “[a]ny person may obtain, from the official 
 
186. Id. 
187. Bethany Brookshire, 4 Reasons Why Many People Don’t Vote, SCIENCE NEWS FOR 
STUDENTS (Nov. 7, 2016, 7:45 AM), https://www.sciencenewsforstudents.org/article/4-reasons-why-
many-people-dont-vote [https://perma.cc/DH85-LRC3] (stating that the four main reasons why people 
do not vote include: registration is a hassle; people without a college degree are less likely to vote; 
people don’t like the two-party system—if they don’t like either candidate, they just don’t vote; and 
apathy and burnout). 
188. WIS. ADMIN. CODE EL § 3.50(2) (Feb. 2017). 
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registration list, voter registration data that is not protected information, upon 
payment of the applicable charges.”189  There are also several programs and 
even phone apps that pull together publicly available data like voting history 
into one searchable database that allow candidates to target voting 
individuals.190  While voter lists are sometimes expensive,191 a list to determine 
which individuals would qualify for WICRC membership is easily 
obtainable.192  
Furthermore, finding less than ten individuals to serve on this commission 
would also not be difficult.  Voter turnout in Wisconsin indicates that there are 
about 1.5 million people out of Wisconsin’s approximately 4,500,000 voting-
age individuals that could be targeted to serve on the WICRC.193  Specifically, 
voter turnout in Wisconsin in the most recent presidential election was 
approximately 66% of the voting age population, meaning that about three 
million potential voters cast ballots; turnout was near 70% in the previous two 
presidential elections.194  Thus, because anywhere between 30%–40% of 
eligible voters do not vote in presidential elections, this means that the potential 
 
189. Id. § 3.50(3). 
190. Michael D. Shear, Obama Campaign Releases iPhone App for Canvassing, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 31, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/31/obama-campaign-releases-
iphone-app-for-canvassing [https://perma.cc/MSD2-UCXC]. 
191. See EL § 3.50(4) (“The charge for reports in electronic format is a $25 base fee per report; 
plus $5 for the first 1,000 voter registration data records, or up to 1,000 voter registration data records; 
plus $5 for each additional 1,000 voter registration data records, rounded to the nearest thousand.  The 
maximum charge for an electronic report is $12,500.”); see also Wis. Elections Commission Will Sell 
Some Voter Info to Presidential Commission, FOX 6 MILWAUKEE (June 30, 2017, 1:22 PM), 
http://fox6now.com/2017/06/30/wisconsin-elections-commission-will-sell-some-voter-information-
to-presidential-commission/ [https://perma.cc/N5BF-R6ZG] (providing that the Wisconsin Elections 
Commission sold voter information (such as name, address, and history) to President Donald Trump's 
Advisory Commission on Election Integrity for the maximum price of $12,500). 
192. See EL § 3.50(2)–(3); Shear, supra note 190. 
193. Compare Wisconsin Election Turnout near 20-year Low, FOX 6 MILWAUKEE (Nov. 9, 
2016, 8:16 AM), http://fox6now.com/2016/11/09/wisconsin-election-turnout-near-20-year-low 
[https://perma.cc/N9ZZ-KJG7] [hereinafter FOX 6 MILWAUKEE] (describing that about three million 
Wisconsinites voted in November 2016, representing a 66% turnout, which was lower than the 70% 
mark of the previous two presidential elections), with Spring Primary Voter Turnout Estimated at 10 
percent, WIS. ELECTIONS COMM’N (Feb. 12, 2016), http://elections.wi.gov/node/3873 
[https://perma.cc/85A3-969X] [hereinafter Spring Primary Turnout] (asserting that, according to 
estimates of the U.S. Census Bureau, as of 2015 Wisconsin’s voting age population was 4,449,170). 
Thus, from these numbers, we can do the math to deduce that the population of non-voters or irregular 
voters in Wisconsin is roughly 1.5 million.  Id.; FOX 6 MILWAUKEE, supra.  
194. FOX 6 MILWAUKEE, supra note 193. 
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pool for WICRC membership is quite large–at least more than one million 
people—to fill a commission that would consist of less than ten people.195   
Again, many may find it counter-intuitive to trust random laypersons with 
a task as important as crafting political districts; however, American society 
trusts random laypeople with important tasks in several other instances.  One 
example includes juries: as long as a juror is impartial, even if they are 
uneducated, untrained, or completely unfamiliar with the issue(s) at hand in a 
case, American society trusts random laypeople with determining whether an 
accused will be put behind bars or can walk free, or whether an individual or 
entity is liable for a large sum of money or nothing at all.196  Wisconsin Statute 
section 756.06 aims to put together juries at random before they are further 
narrowed and vetted by the judge and attorneys during voir dire.197  
Specifically, Wisconsin gathers the list of potential jurors for the circuit court 
of each county primarily from the Department of Transportation list of 
individuals who are “licensed as a motor vehicle operator . . . or who ha[ve] 
received an identification card.”198  So, while each county in Wisconsin can use 
additional lists, people who are selected for jury service are those who at least 
have a driver’s license or an identification card;199 “[a] list of registered voters” 
is what is included in the list of other information that can be considered.200  
Thus, when thinking about it, Wisconsin already relies upon many citizens who 
are non-voters or seldom voters to serve on juries, because having an 
identification card does not guarantee that you are a regular or registered voter. 
Moreover, the membership of the WICRC and California’s CRC would not 
be that different.  While I am proposing a scheme that advocates for the use of 
non-voters or infrequent voters, Wisconsin and California would both be 
utilizing everyday citizens to draw district maps.201  Professor Cain notes how 
California’s experiment of using citizens had moderate success, as over 4,500 
 
195. The pool is probably larger considering that voter turnout is usually much higher for 
presidential elections.  For instance, in the spring 2016 primary, Wisconsin was predicted to have a 
voting turnout of about 10%—444,000 of its total voting-age population of about 4,500,000 
individuals.  See Spring Primary Turnout, supra note 193. 
196. Nancy S. Marder & Valerie P. Hans, Introduction to Juries and Lay Participation: 
American Perspectives and Global Trends, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 789, 798–99 (2015) (noting how 
American jury scholars are more inclined to put their trust in jurors instead of judges because there is 
a reluctance to fight “a single man” and juries put together a range of experiences and perspectives and 
represent “the commonsense judgment of the community”). 
197. WIS. STAT. § 756.06(1) (2015–2016). 
198. Id. § 756.04(2)(b). 
199. Id. § 756.04(2)(b)–(c). 
200. Id. § 756.04(2)(c). 
201. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(a)(1) (West 2017). 
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people applied to be on the CRC and the CRC drew maps that adhered to 
constitutional criteria and produced districts that were more competitive and 
compact than before.202  While there might be a stereotype that nonvoters are 
uneducated or inexperienced individuals,203 it is folly to think that nonvoter 
equates with unintelligent.204 There is no reason to think that the universe of 
nonvoters consists entirely of people who lack the skills necessary to supervise 
and direct the district drawing process—they merely need to be temporary 
experts in cartography for drawing political boundaries.  There are many 
contributing members of society who are nonvoters or irregular voters that 
would be very well qualified to serve on a citizens redistricting commission.  
For instance, one example includes Jim Lehrer—the moderator for the first 
presidential debate between President Barack Obama and Republican nominee 
Mitt Romney in 2012—who has a reputation that is “unassailable.  He reeks 
integrity”; however, Mr. Lehrer does not vote.205  In an example of an average 
citizen, Michael M. Lazerow describes a forty-nine year old citizen of Indiana 
named Nancy Koscher who does not vote, yet she remains involved in public 
affairs and is a contributing member of society by following local school board 
decisions, owns a carpet-installation business, and raises money for the Elkhart 
Red Cross chapter.206  There are thousands of people out there just like Nancy 
who are well-informed, contributing members of society who would be fit to 





202. Cain, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 116, at 1825, 1827. 
203. See Michael M. Lazerow, A Show of Apathy, Anger at Polls: Survey Shows Nonvoters Don’t 
Fit a Single Stereotype, NONVOTERS IN AMERICA (1996), http://nonvotersinamerica.com/1996/08/a-
show-of-apathy-anger-at-polls-survey-shows-nonvoters-dont-fit-a-single-stereotype 
[https://perma.cc/54TY-M9P9] [hereinafter Lazerow, Nonvoters in America] (describing that the 
popular stereotype for nonvoters is that they are “younger, poorer, less educated and less informed than 
the likely voter”). 
204. Winston Churchill once said, “The best argument against democracy is a five-minute 
conversation with the average voter.”  Michael Deacon, Why Winston Churchill Will Always be the 
Last Word in Political Wit, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 22, 2012, 8:44 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9696402/Why-Winston-Churchill-will-always-be-the-last-
word-in-political-wit.html [https://perma.cc/8S78-NFR5]. 
205. Dylan Byers, The Most Trusted Moderator in America, POLITICO (Sept. 9, 2012, 12:22 
PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2012/09/the-most-trusted-moderator-in-america-137002 
[https://perma.cc/TS6C-WTZQ]. 
206. Lazerow, Nonvoters in America, supra note 203. 
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2. Addressing Potential Counterarguments Against the Wisconsin Impartial 
Citizens Redistricting Commission 
There are a few noteworthy concerns to address about implementing 
something like the WICRC.  First, by trusting nonvoters or irregular voters with 
the important task of redrawing political districts, Wisconsin could be 
condoning, or perhaps rewarding, the act of not voting.  The right to vote:  
[I]s a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.  
Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and 
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and 
political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens 
to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.207 
While this is a valid concern, however, I do not see the WICRC as minimizing the 
importance of voting, but rather as doing something of the opposite.  Specifically, 
“[p]ublic engagement enhances the Government’s effectiveness and improves the 
quality of its decisions. . . . Collaboration actively engages Americans in the work 
of their Government.”208  By empowering average citizens with such an important 
task, Wisconsinites overall could actually become even more engaged in the 
political process, which could even perhaps inspire nonvoters to vote.209  
Something like the WICRC could actually inspire and reinvigorate an enthusiasm 
for attention to public affairs, which could ultimately enhance our democracy by 
making the government more responsive to the needs and desires of the people it 
represents.  
Another legitimate concern about a system such as the WICRC is that the 
individuals who will be selected to serve on the commission will be held up for 
a long time.  For example, in California, selection to the CRC takes about one 
year alone,210 and then the actual redistricting process would begin the next 
 
207. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964). 
208. Memorandum from the Admin. of President Barack Obama on Transparency and Open 
Gov’t for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies No. 15, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
209. See generally Gilbert, Red & Blue, supra note 9, at 18 (describing in various ways how 
Wisconsinites are quick to become politically active).  Therefore, a new scheme like the WICRC could 
stir political interest and activity in the state.  See Tom Kertscher, 100,000 Pro-union Protesters Were 
Shipped into Wisconsin, Scott Walker Says, POLITIFACT WISCONSIN (July 30, 2015, 1:54 PM), 
http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2015/jul/30/scott-walker/pro-union-protesters-were-
shipped-wisconsin-scott- [https://perma.cc/YZ2Z-TY3Y] (providing an example of how 
Wisconsinites have been politically active lately as thousands of protestors flocked to Madison in 
protest of the passage of Act 10 in 2011). 
210. Compare CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(a)(1) (West 2017) (“By August 15 in each year ending 
in the number nine, the State Auditor shall initiate an application process, open to all registered 
California voters . . . .”), with id. § 8252(g) (“No later than August 15 in each year ending in the number 
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year, which would be the year following the census.211  California quashes the 
concern of holding this task over the commission’s head for too long by 
requiring that potential members apply;212 applicants to the CRC essentially 
concede to this concern, as they know what they are getting themselves into.  In 
order to suppress these concerns in Wisconsin, part of the screening process 
could be to ensure that potential members are able to make such a commitment, 
such as by excusing those who could not make such a commitment for medical 
or employment reasons.213  Additionally, members to the WICRC could be 
compensated for their service on the commission, just like other states do for 
their commission members.214  A compensation provision could perhaps 
incentivize participation in the WICRC. 
Finally, one last concern to address is, similar to the discussion of Professor 
Cain’s points above, the employment of staff to assist the WICRC could 
actually present a risk of manipulation of the WICRC members, as the staff 
would inevitably be more familiar with the process than laypersons.215  
However, such concerns about a partisan or devious staff are calmed by 
utilizing the nonpartisan staff already assisting the Wisconsin Elections 
Commission (WEC) and by also placing limits on what kind of advice the staff 
can provide to the WICRC, which is discussed below. 
3. Available Checks on the Wisconsin Impartial Citizens Redistricting 
Commission 
There can be several checks on the WICRC.  For one thing, the 
vetting/screening process done by the WEC when selecting the members can 
ensure that members, although they are not regular voters, have at least a 
minimum competency and understanding of the great task that they are being 
 
zero, the eight commissioners shall review the remaining names in the subpools of applicants and 
appoint six applicants to the commissions . . . .”). 
211. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1 (“In the year following the year in which the national census is 
taken under the direction of Congress at the beginning of each decade, the Citizens Redistricting 
Commission . . . shall adjust the boundary lines of the congressional, State Senatorial, 
Assembly . . . districts . . . .”). 
212. GOV’T § 8252(a)(1). 
213. This would be similar to how a juror would be dismissed if they cannot fulfill their duties.  
See WIS. STAT. § 756.03 (2015–2016). 
214. For examples, see GOV’T § 8253.5 (“Members of the commission shall be compensated at 
the rate of three hundred dollars ($300) for each day the member is engaged in commission business.”), 
and IOWA CODE § 42.5(1)(d) (2017) (stating that commission members are reimbursed for “necessary 
expenses incurred in performing their duties”). 
215. Cain, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 116, at 1835. 
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given responsibility of.216  It is also important to note that a large part of this 
screening process would be to, as best as possible, quash any prospect of 
selecting someone to the WICRC who would be secretly partisan—such as 
someone who actually did not vote in a recent election thinking that their vote 
did not matter because they assumed that their candidate would win or lose.217 
Enlisting such individuals for WICRC membership could otherwise cause the 
whole system to crumble.218  In addition, an inherent check on redrawing 
political districts is that the redrawn districts stand for ten years, as the 
Constitution requires a new census to be taken every ten years.219  Finally, even 
though this provides a prospect of partisanship entering the process, another 
check could be to treat the WICRC redrawn maps as any other piece of 
legislation in Wisconsin, subjecting them to bicameral and gubernatorial 
approval.  However, to block any attempts by legislators to alter the newly 
drawn political districts in their party’s favor, there could be limits on the 
legislature’s ability to amend the redrawn boundaries, similar to a requirement 
in Iowa limiting legislative amendments to ones that are simply corrective or 
provide nonbinding recommendations.220  Another way to combat potential 
political influence from legislators would be, whether in conjunction with or as 
a substitute of legislative approval, to put the newly drawn maps on the ballot.221  
In this manner, not only could legislators have a check on the WICRC, but also 
voting Wisconsinites could have a check on the members of the WICRC.  In 
short, there are several checks on the WICRC that can ensure that the maps are 
constructed adequately, competently, and in as nonpartisan of a way as 
possible.  
 
216. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
217. This was actually a phenomenon that occurred in the 2016 presidential election, as many 
nonvoters who would have voted for Hillary Clinton did not vote because they thought that she surely 
would defeat Donald Trump.  Sarah Marsh, “I Never Thought Trump Would Win”: Meet the Americans 
Who Chose Not to Vote, GUARDIAN (Nov. 18, 2016, 12:32 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/18/donald-trump-win-americans-not-vote 
[https://perma.cc/AT7E-WTRW]. 
218. See Cain, Redistricting Commission, supra note 116, at 1833–34. 
219. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
220. See IOWA CODE § 42.3(1)(a) (2017). 
221. This would be similar to how California’s maps as drawn by the CRC become effective 
only upon approval by a public referendum. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(g)–(j); see also Ariz. State 
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2015); BLUE BOOK 2013–
2014, supra note 65, at 226 (“Statewide referendum questions are submitted to the electorate by the 
Wisconsin Legislature: 1) to ratify a law extending the right of suffrage (as required by the state 
constitution); 2) to ratify a law that has been passed contingent on voter approval; or 3) to seek voter 
opinion through an advisory referendum.  Since 1848, the Wisconsin Legislature has presented 53 
referendum questions to the Wisconsin electorate . . . [and] 39 were ratified.” (first alteration in 
original)). 
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In sum, the Wisconsin Impartial Citizens Redistricting Commission is a 
solution that aims to tightly seal the lid to prevent any partisanship from 
sneaking into the process, as it would consist of impartial citizens that are likely 
apolitical and who would be charged with minimizing partisanship and 
maximizing competition. 
B. The Selection and Mechanics of the Wisconsin Impartial Citizens 
Redistricting Commission 
The citizens serving on the Wisconsin Impartial Citizens Redistricting 
Commission would be selected in a process of randomness and screening to 
ensure that they are competent for the task and are as ideologically 
dispassionate as possible.  The group would also be equipped and situated to 
ensure that the members operate in an impartial way to maximize competition 
when drawing the maps.  
1. Selecting Members to the Wisconsin Impartial Citizens Redistricting 
Commission 
The first part of producing an impartial WICRC involves determining how 
members to the commission are selected, and which individuals are even 
eligible.  First, given the highly partisan redistricting process that Wisconsin 
experienced in 2011, the state legislature should be excluded from the 
redrawing process as much as possible, and this would include depriving the 
leadership within the state legislature the authority to appoint commission 
members in a new scheme.222  So, the goals of impartial redistricting would be 
best served if Wisconsin took an approach similar to that of California by 
relying on citizens of the state to redraw the political boundaries.  However, 
unlike California whose commission members must be a registered voter within 
the state,223 Wisconsin should scrap the requirement of limiting commission 
membership to only registered voters.  Rather, the WICRC should consist of 
citizens who either have never voted or who have a very sparse voting record.  
This would be a very crucial first step in removing any hint of partisanship from 
the redistricting process because not only does it take the pencil out of the hands 
of the majority party of the state legislature, but it also does not call for the 
increasingly polarized voters of Wisconsin, who are likely just as partisan and 
biased, to draw district boundaries.  Rather, it calls for assembling the most 
ideologically dispassionate group possible, which can be found in nonvoters. 
 
222. This would be unlike the vast majority of states who utilize redistricting commissions.  See 
Redistricting Commissions, NCSL, supra note 96 (providing examples of redistricting commissions 
wherein the members are selected by state legislators or actually are state legislators). 
223. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(a) (West 2017); CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(3). 
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The Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) and its staff would have the 
responsibility of running the selection process to select WICRC members.  For 
the purposes of impartiality, this would be preferred over giving such authority 
to members of the state legislature.  This is because state legislators are the ones 
who could directly benefit from redistricting, while the WEC, albeit having a 
partisan makeup with three Republican individuals and three Democratic 
individuals, comprises of appointed, nonelected members who are charged with 
enforcing the state’s election laws and is served by a nonpartisan staff.224  
Additionally, the WEC falls under the purview of Wisconsin Statute section 
230.40, which mandates the following: 
No person holding any position in the classified civil service 
may during the hours when on duty engage in any form of 
political activity calculated to favor or improve the chances of 
any political party or any person seeking or attempting to hold 
partisan political office . . . .  Any violation of this section is 
adequate grounds for dismissal.225 
So, the WEC would be the ideal entity to guide the selection process of WICRC 
members because, although the WEC does have a partisan build, the members 
face strict prohibitions to ensure that they are politically neutral when carrying out 
their duties.226  
Keeping in mind the information described in the previous section 
regarding the easy access to voter history lists and availability of infrequent 
voters, similar to how each year “the office of the director of state 
courts . . . compile[s] a master list of potential jurors for use by the circuit courts 
of each county during the coming year” based upon a list submitted by the 
Department of Transportation of each person who has a driver’s license or an 
 
224. Governor Walker signed 2015 Wisconsin Act 118 on December 16, 2015, “which 
eliminate[d] the Government Accountability Board on June 30, 2016 and replace[d] it with two 
separate commissions to oversee the administration of elections and ethics.”  See Transition from 
G.A.B. to Elections and Ethics Commissions, WIS. ELECTIONS COMM’N, 
http://elections.wi.gov/transition [https://perma.cc/2U4P-BL8P] (last visited Jan. 5, 2017).  The 
Commission is comprised of six members: one is appointed by the Senate minority leader, one is 
appointed by the Senate majority leader, one is appointed by the Assembly Speaker, one is appointed 
by the Assembly Minority leader, and two are appointed by the governor—one from each political 
party.  Id.  The terms for these members expires in either May of 2019 or 2021. Id.; see also About the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, WIS. ELECTIONS COMM’N, http://elections.wi.gov/about 
[https://perma.cc/F837-NPSF] (last visited Oct. 3, 2017) (stating that “[t]he Commission staff is non-
partisan”). 
225. WIS. STAT. § 230.40(1) (2015–2016). 
226. Id. 
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identification card,227 a master list of potential WICRC members based on 
voting history information could be compiled by the WEC.  Compiling this list 
of infrequent voters is step one to determining the membership of the WICRC. 
The way in which WICRC members are selected can be modeled after how 
juries are selected in Wisconsin.  After compiling the master list of potential 
WICRC members based upon voting records, the next step would be for the 
WEC to randomly strike potential members from this list.  Under Wisconsin 
Statute section 756.06(1), when narrowing down prospective jurors, “the clerk 
of circuit court shall randomly select names from the prospective jury venire 
until the desired number is obtained to create the jury panel.”228  In a similar 
way, from the master list of potential WICRC members of Wisconsin citizens 
with at least sparse voting records, a desired number of individuals would be 
randomly selected from the pool by the WEC.229  Similar to how an individual 
in Wisconsin receives notification in the mail for him or her to report for jury 
duty,230 individuals at this stage would also receive a letter from the WEC to 
draft them to be a potential WICRC member.   
The next step would be to engage in a screening process of prospective 
members to ensure that they are qualified to serve and are impartial in every 
way possible.  First, because service on the WICRC would be a long 
commitment,231 individuals at this stage could be excused if they present any of 
a variety of legitimate reasons, such as medical concerns or employment, which 
would prevent them from fulfilling such a responsibility.  This would be similar 
to how, according to Wisconsin Statute section 756.03, a court can excuse an 
individual who was summoned for jury duty if that person cannot fulfill their 
role.232   
 
227. Id. § 756.04(2)(a)–(c).  The statute describes how other lists “may” be used in addition to 
the list provided by the Department of Transportation, such as “[a] list of registered voters from the 
elections commission.”  Id.  
228. Id. § 756.06(1) (“Whenever an issue is to be tried before a jury, the clerk of circuit court 
shall randomly select names from the jury venire until the desired number is obtained to create the jury 
panel.  The random selection of names may include the provision that jurors reporting for service who 
have not been considered for assignment to a panel be considered before other jurors are considered 
for a second panel.”). 
229. This would be similar to the selection of CRC members in California, as section 8252(b) 
states that “[t]he State Auditor shall randomly draw names from a pool consisting of all qualified 
independent auditors” who are then in charge of screening applicants.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(b) 
(West 2017). 
230. WIS. STAT. § 756.05 (“The summons may be served by 1st class mail or another method.”). 
231. See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text (providing an example of how California’s 
redistricting process takes over one year). 
232. WIS. STAT. § 756.03. 
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Next, after such individuals have been excused and possibly replaced, the 
remaining potential members would undergo a screening process conducted by 
the WEC.  In Wisconsin, after a jury panel is selected, judges examine each 
potential juror to determine if there is any sign of partiality that they would have 
in the decision-making process.233  This includes determining if 
the juror is related by blood, marriage or adoption to any party 
or to any attorney appearing in the case, or has any financial 
interest in the case, or has expressed or formed any opinion, or 
is aware of any bias or prejudice in the case.  If a juror is not 
indifferent in the case, the juror shall be excused.234 
Similarly, potential WICRC members can be automatically struck by the WEC if 
they are identified to have any inkling of political bias.  For instance, similar to the 
selection process of other states as discussed in Part III, individuals would be 
struck if they themselves or a relative is or was a public official, ran for public 
office, contributed to a campaign, served on a public official’s staff, or in any other 
way has been involved in politics so that they might have a partisan leaning. 
As a supplement for the court’s general questions, attorneys are also 
permitted to ask the jury panel further individual questions in a process known 
as voir dire.235  In a similar way, the WEC could be charged with vetting and 
questioning prospective WICRC members.  The main task of the WEC in this 
step would be to syphon out any partisanship leanings that any potential 
member may have.  Question topics could include why they don’t regularly 
vote; if an individual identifies with a political party even though they don’t 
vote (for instance, if an individual indicated that they did not vote in the 2016 
presidential election because they thought Hillary Clinton would win, this 
would disqualify them from participation in the WICRC because it shows a 
partisan lean);236 or perhaps even if an individual prefers to watch Fox News or 
CNN.237  In addition to consideration of competency, qualifications, and fitness 
 
233. Id. § 805.08(1). 
234. Id. 
235. See generally Filipiak v. Plombon, 15 Wis. 2d 484, 113 N.W.2d 365 (1962); Voir Dire, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1805 (Bryan A. Garner et al. eds., 10th ed. 2014) (“[a] preliminary 
examination of a prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to decide whether the prospect is qualified and 
suitable to serve on a jury.  Loosely, the term refers to the jury selection phase of a trial.”)   
236. See Marsh, “I Never Thought Trump Would Win”, supra note 217 (describing how a 
popular reason for many Democrats not voting in the 2016 presidential election is because they thought 
Hillary Clinton was a lock to win). 
237. See Jesse Holcomb, 5 facts about Fox News, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 14, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/14/five-facts-about-fox-news [https://perma.cc/7RC6-
LCNK] (“60% of Fox News viewers describe themselves as conservative . . . .  By contrast, the 
ideological makeup of CNN viewers . . . and MSNBC viewers . . . is far more mixed.”). 
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to serve, when making its determinations, similar to the selection requirements 
of other redistricting commissions, the WEC should also choose a group of 
individuals that adequately and appropriately reflect the state’s geographical 
and demographic makeup, such as requiring that members must be from 
different counties or regions of the state and that the membership reflect the 
overall gender and racial makeup of the state.238  
Finally, the final membership—which would ideally consist of about six 
individuals—would be drawn randomly from a pool of a couple dozen 
individuals that the WEC has chosen through its screening process.  This helps 
ensure that the WEC does not have final authority over who serves on the 
WICRC by directly selecting its membership.  
2. Rules and Requirements Governing the Operation of the Wisconsin 
Impartial Citizens Redistricting Commission 
Determining what information the members will have access to and what 
guidelines the members must follow when constructing the new districts is 
important to ensure that the WICRC remains impartial after its members are 
selected and assembled.  Currently, because the Wisconsin state legislature has 
the constitutional responsibility to draw the district lines,239 the majority party 
at the time of redistricting can consider any information that they want, such as 
not only population data, but also information concerning racial demographics, 
voting patterns, partisanship, per capita incomes, education levels, and religious 
views.240  Considering how access to such information would make it very easy 
to craft districts in a way that conforms with partisan goals, an important feature 
of the WICRC would be to strictly provide the commission members with only 
 
238. See N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2, ¶ 1(a) (“The members of the commission shall be appointed 
with due consideration to geographic, ethnic and racial diversity . . . .”); see also ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, 
pt. 2, § 1(3) (“Of the first four members appointed, no more than two shall reside in the same county.”).  
This is similar to the requirement in Wisconsin that if a jury panel does not adequately reflect a 
community’s racial and ethnic makeup, a trial court may declare a mistrial and again randomly select 
prospective jurors that better represent the demographical makeup of a community.  See Oliver v. 
Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 179 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 505 N.W.2d 452, 456 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); see also State 
v. Bond, 41 Wis. 2d 219, 227, 163 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Wis. 1969) (“The jury selection system 
contemplates the intervention of chance and requires that chance must freely operate on a truly 
representative cross section of the community’s population.  [The defendant] is not entitled to a 
perfectly apportioned representation on his jury . . . but to only a fair jury from a panel selected without 
regard to race or other discriminatory factors.”). 
239. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3; id. art. V, § 10. 
240. Using information beyond population data was evidenced in 2011, as the drafters of Act 43 
closely monitored voting patterns and partisanship levels of the districts they were constructing.  See 
Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 848 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
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the population of each county, city, and ward in Wisconsin during the initial 
drafting phases.241  When drawing the districts, the WICRC members would be 
able to use computer software that would show them the county, city, and ward 
divides and populations and also let them know only the population of the 
districts they have drawn.242  Also, the WICRC should have a few more 
 
241. This is similar to what is mandated by chapter 42 of the Iowa Code.  As the LSA redraws 
districts: 
[N]o use shall be made of any of the following data:  
(a) Addresses of incumbent legislators or members of Congress.   
(b) Political affiliations of registered voters.   
(c) Previous election results.   
(d) Demographic information, other than population head counts, except as 
required by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. 
IOWA CODE § 42.4(5) (2017). 
242. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 847–48.  Ottman described the redistricting software called 
autoBound that was used by the drafters in the 2011 redistricting process:  
 [Y]ou would open up a plan that you’d been working on or label a new plan and 
assign it the Assembly district that you wanted . . . that Assembly district to be.  
It’s sort of like a color-by-number exercise. . . . You also determine what other 
layers that you want to look at on the screen.  There were a number of different 
overlays that you have, anywhere from existing Senate and Assembly 
districts, . . . count[y] boundaries, municipal boundaries, ward boundaries all the 
way down to census block boundaries.  As a practical matter what you tried to do 
is you would zoom in the region of your screen to the area that you’re looking at 
to the smallest amount that you could see and then have kind of the fewest layers 
displayed that you would need. . . . And then what you would do is there were a 
couple different ways that you could add population to the district. 
Id.  (first, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original).   
In the case, Ottman further explained that in the more popular regions of the state he and the other 
drafters would look more at a ward level: “So you would have the wards displayed and you would 
literally draw a circle, click on it, and it would assign it to the map and fill it in.  In other parts of the 
state . . . you might do that at the county level because it’s so sparsely populated so you’d grab three 
or four counties at [a] time.”  Id at 848.  (alterations in original) (footnote omitted).  Moreover, Judge 
Ripple noted: 
When the drafters would increase the area size of the districts that they were 
drawing, autoBound provided demographic information for the area that the 
drafter had included, such as the number of people in the district, the deviation 
from the ideal population, voting-age population, and different minority group 
populations.  It also allowed the user to include “customized . . . demographic 
data.”  One piece of “customized demographic data” employed by the drafters 
was a composite partisan score.  From the time that Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick 
received the census data from the LTSB, they worked to develop a composite 
partisan score that accurately reflected the political make-up of the population 
units.  Having this measure was necessary so that, when they aggregated those 
units into new districts, they could assess the partisan make-up of the new district 
they had drawn. 
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requirements in addition to federal guidelines and Wisconsin guidelines.  For 
example, the districts should not be irregularly shaped and also no district 
should be drawn for the purpose of favoring one political endeavor over 
another.243  
With the above requirements in place, in addition to having at least a sparse 
voting record and also having gone through an extensive vetting process to be 
deemed impartial, WICRC members are essentially going to operate with an 
untainted picture of Wisconsin with nonpartisan goals.  However, in order for 
the WICRC to also maximize competition, the WICRC would inevitably need 
access to partisanship scores of the districts they craft so that they don’t 
accidentally draw districts that heavily favor one party over the other.  In this 
effort, after crafting the districts based only on population data, the WICRC 
would have strict limits on keeping the scores between the parties as close to 
50%-50% as possible and maximizing the amount of swing districts within the 
state.  In this way, the WICRC would be achieving the mandate that it cannot 
favor one political party over the other. 
Many would argue that it is illogical to provide the WICRC with 
partisanship scores when the use of partisanship scores was largely how 
Republicans were able to craft the political boundaries in their favor in 2011.244  
While this is a valid concern, however, partisanship scores would be necessary 
for the WICRC to enhance competition and advance democratic principles.  
Specifically, drawing political boundaries based only on population data, while 
preventing partisan considerations, does not guarantee that the districts will be 
more competitive.  So, it would be important to provide the WICRC with 
information beyond only population data so that it can not only craft 
nonpartisan boundaries, but also draw lines that maximize competition amongst 
the districts of Wisconsin.  In attempt to quash concerns of providing 
partisanship scores, the WICRC would face strict limits concerning the use of 
partisanship scores: partisanship scores would be provided only after 
consideration of population and the WICRC would have to stay within a certain 
percentage range to ensure that the parties have a fair chance in the districts.  
 
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
243. This is similar to the requirement in Iowa that “[d]istricts shall be reasonably compact in 
form . . . .  In general, reasonably compact districts are those which are square, rectangular, or 
hexagonal in shape, and not irregularly shaped, to the extent permitted by natural or political 
boundaries.”  IOWA CODE § 42.4(4) (2017).  This is also similar to the provision in Iowa stating “No 
district shall be drawn for the purpose of favoring a political party, incumbent legislator or member of 
Congress, or other person or group, or for the purpose of augmenting or diluting the voting strength of 
a language or racial minority group.”  Id. § 42.4(5). 
244. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 848. 
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Therefore, allowing the WICRC to access partisanship scores enhances the 
democratic principles and values of the competition of ideas245 by maximizing 
the number of swing districts within the state rather than continuing the practice 
of crafting districts that produce legislators who are only answerable to the 
dominant constituency.  Thus, it is completely plausible to think that irregular 
voters can achieve relatively the same, or even greater, success as the CRC did 
for California at creating competitive districts.246 
Another important part of ensuring complete impartiality and insulation 
from politics is to have the WICRC deliberate in secrecy.  The importance of 
private deliberations to have frank discussion and avoid outside pressures was 
underscored in America’s founding as the Founding Fathers crafted the 
Constitution in secret in Independence Hall,247 and this practice continues to be 
applied in present-day jury procedures.  For instance, Wisconsin Statute section 
756.08(2) requires that during deliberations on a verdict, jurors must be held in 
private and cannot communicate with others regarding the deliberations until a 
verdict has been reached.248  In a similar way, the WICRC members should be 
required to draw the new maps in seclusion from the public until the maps are 
released so that they are shielded from outside influences.  However, the 
WICRC would be allowed to have the assistance from staff.249  Yet, unlike in 
California in which the staff serving the CRC technically has no limits on its 
partisanship,250 the WEC’s nonpartisan staff would assist the WICRC.251  In 
 
245. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (advocating for the dominant 
public policy of American free speech law to advance the idea of the marketplace of ideas). 
246. Cain, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 116, at 1827. 
247. EDWARD J. LARSON & MICHAEL P. WINSHIP, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: A 
NARRATIVE HISTORY FROM THE NOTES OF JAMES MADISON 11 (1st ed., 2005) (“On Monday, May 
28, the Convention worked out its rules, the most important of which was that all proceedings would 
be kept secret for the duration of the Convention.”). 
248. WIS. STAT. § 756.08(2) (2015–2016) (“When the issues have been submitted to the jury, a 
proper officer, subject to the direction of the court, shall swear or affirm that the officer will keep all 
jurors together in some private and convenient place until they have agreed on and rendered their 
verdict, are permitted to separate or are discharged by the court.  While the jurors are under the 
supervision of the officer, he or she may not permit them to communicate with any person regarding 
their deliberations or the verdict that they have agreed upon, except as authorized by the court.”). 
249. This would be similar to how California allows its commission to “hire commission staff, 
legal counsel, and consultants as needed.”  CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 8253(a)(5) (West 2017). 
250. Id.; Cain, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 116, at 1834–35. 
251. About the Wisconsin Elections Commission, WIS. ELECTIONS COMM’N, 
http://elections.wi.gov/about [https://perma.cc/R73A-PFM9] (last visited Oct. 3, 2017) (stating that 
“[t]he Commission staff is non-partisan”); see also Transition from G.A.B. to Elections and Ethics 
Commissions, WIS. ELECTIONS COMM’N, http://elections.wi.gov/transition [https://perma.cc/H47J-
H7Z7] (last visited Jan. 5, 2017). 
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helping the WICRC craft districts, the staff would be strictly limited to 
answering technical, objective questions, such as helping use the software, 
providing the population required for each district, and providing how many 
districts need to be crafted. 
In sum, the mechanics of the WICRC would be set up so that the WICRC 
remains ideologically indifferent while crafting districts, yet also is provided 
with information to maximize competition in the state. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Comment has been to introduce a unique framework 
for Wisconsin to adopt to reform its redistricting process in order to curtail 
gerrymandering.  In exercising their constitutional prerogative of regulating 
elections, many states continue to follow the example set by Governor Gerry in 
1812 and craft political boundaries in order to give the majority party 
advantages in elections to solidify power.252  This is exactly what happened in 
Wisconsin in 2011, as many state legislative and congressional districts were 
gerrymandered to give the majority party a better chance of winning elections 
in the decennial period.253   
While many other states have instituted commissions to curtail 
gerrymandering, there are several pitfalls that such entities exhibit.254  Given 
such shortcomings and the fact that Wisconsin is an ever-growing politically 
active and polarized state, Wisconsin should adopt a unique framework to craft 
its political districts in a way that squeezes partisanship out of the process.  As 
I have proposed, this would involve something that no other state has done: 
using citizens who seldom vote or who never vote to draw the districts.   
While a solution like the Wisconsin Impartial Citizens Redistricting 
Commission is much needed in Wisconsin, regardless of who serves on the 
commission, at this time reform is unlikely given the current political climate 
in Wisconsin.  Specifically, Wisconsin is presently under Republican control, 
with Republican majorities in both houses of the legislature and a Republican 
holding the governor’s office.255  Thus, it is unlikely that Republicans would 
 
252. See Hulse, Gerrymandering’s Legacy, supra note 13. 
253. See Wines, Wisconsin Redistricting Favored Republicans, supra note 4. 
254. See supra Part III. 
255. Shawn Johnson, Wisconsin GOP Widens Margins in State Legislature, WISCONSIN PUBLIC 
RADIO (Nov. 9, 2016, 6:15 AM), http://www.wpr.org/wisconsin-gop-widens-margins-state-legislature 
[https://perma.cc/24VM-KCBS] (emphasizing how Republicans grew their majorities in the State 
Senate and Assembly in the 2016 election).  Shawn Johnson also states that “[t]he results will give 
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reform a scheme that benefits them, as this would essentially relinquish power 
to the minority party and “reverse[] the time-honored political logic of ‘to the 
winner go the spoils’”;256 Republicans stand to have control after the 2020 
census and thus could ensure their control until even 2030 and beyond.257  Yet, 
such concerns did not stop some states from recently reforming their 
redistricting process.258  For example, despite having Republicans control both 
chambers of the state legislature and the governor’s office, Ohio in 2015 
accumulated bipartisan support to pass a constitutional amendment to create a 
bipartisan redistricting commission for the drawing of state legislative 
districts.259 
If the reader is to grasp anything from this Comment, it is this: the time for 
redistricting reform in Wisconsin is now.  Momentum for change is ever 
growing, and perhaps has even reached its peak.  Several reasons account for 
this: (1) more states are employing varying forms of redistricting bodies rather 
than continuing to rely on state legislatures;260 a federal court in Whitford v. Gill 
just laid down a momentous decision by ruling that the Wisconsin legislative 
redistricting in 2011 was unconstitutional because it burdened the 
representational rights of Democratic voters, and it articulated a clear standard 
that may calm the concerns of the Supreme Court to soon strike down a partisan 
gerrymander;261 and the Supreme Court in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission made it evident that the Court would 
look favorably upon bodies that are created to curtail partisan 
gerrymandering.262  Momentum is growing in Wisconsin in many other ways, 
as several groups, such as Common Cause in Wisconsin, the League of Women 
 
Republican Gov. Scott Walker his biggest GOP majorities yet when lawmakers return to Madison . . . .”  
Id.   
256. Cain, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 116, at 1836. 
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Voters, and the Wisconsin Democracy Campaign, are beginning to take up the 
cause and stir grass-roots efforts towards redistricting reform.263  The 
opportunity for reform in Wisconsin is ripe, and it must be seized. 
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